To grab for the market or to bide one's time: A dynamic model of entry

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 536-556

  Levin, Dan ^a   Peck, James ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242679597     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593745     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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