The market reaction to the disclosure of supervisory actions: Implications for bank transparency

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 298-319

  Jordan, John S ^a   Peek, Joe ^b   Rosengren, Eric S ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038178216     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.2000.0292     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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