Multilateralism, bilateralism, and exclusion in the nuclear proliferation regime

International Organization

Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 439-476

  Verdier, Daniel ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 46749126214     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818308080156     Document Type: Article

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