Path dependence and complementarity in corporate governance

Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 114-127

  Schmidt, Reinhard H ^a   Spindler, Gerald ^b  

^a GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926961507     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511665905.004     Document Type: Chapter

References (18)

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2. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Mark J. Roe (1999), “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,” Stanford Law Review 52 (1): 127–70.
3. Charkham, Jonathan (1994), Keeping Good Company: A Comparison of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Franks, Julian & Colin Mayer (1994), “Corporate Control: A Comparison of Insider and Outsider Systems,” Working Paper, London Business School.
5. Hackethal, Andreas & Reinhard H. Schmidt (2000), “Finanzsystem und Komplementarität,” Kredit und Kapital, Supplement “Finanzm¨arkte im Umbruch,” 53–102.
6. Hackethal, Andreas, Reinhard H. Schmidt, & Marcel Tyrell (2002), “Corporate Governance in Germany: Transition to a Modern Capital-Market Based System?” (forthcoming JITE 2003).
7. Milgrom, Paul & John Roberts (1990) “The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization,” 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 511.
8. Milgrom, Paul & John Roberts (1995a), “Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 19: 179–208.
9. Milgrom, Paul & John Roberts (1995b), “Continuous Adjustment and Fundamental Change in Business Strategy and Organization,” in Siebert, Horst, ed. (1995), Trends in Business Organization: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness?, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 231–58.
10. Porter, Michael E. (1996), “What is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review 74: 61–78.
11. Roe, Mark (1994), Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
12. Roe, Mark (1996), “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109: 641–63.
13. Roe, Mark (1997), “Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems,” in Klaus J. Hopt et al., eds., Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 847–75.
14. Schmidt, Reinhard H. (2001): “Kontinuität und Wandel bei der Corporate Governance in Deutschland,” Zeitschrift f¨ur betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Sonderheft 47–01, pp. 61–87.
15. Schmidt, Reinhard H. & Stefanie Grohs (2000), “Angleichung der Unternehmensverfassung in Europa: ein Forschungsprogramm,” in S. Grundmann, ed., Systembildung und Systemlücken in Kerngebieten des Europ¨aischen Privatrechts’, T¨ubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 145–88.
16. Schmidt, Reinhard H. & Gerald Spindler (2002): “Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and Complementarity,” International Finance 5 (3): 311–33.
17. Spindler, Gerald (1993), Recht und Konzern, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
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