Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 45-74

  Khanna, Tarun ^a   Rivkin, Jan W ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Business groups; Corporate strategy; Emerging markets; Profit differences; Variance components

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001937627     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/1097-0266(200101)22:1<45::AID-SMJ147>3.0.CO;2-F     Document Type: Article

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