Morality and virtue: An assessment of some recent work in virtue ethics

Ethics

Volumn 114, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 514-554

  Copp, David ^a   Sobel, David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 4544233457     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/382058     Document Type: Review

References (110)

1. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
2. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
3. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
5. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
6. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
7. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
8. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Other recent books in and around virtue ethics that we unfortunately cannot adequately consider here include Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Doris's Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
9. Driver.
10. Robert Merrihew Adams, "Motive Utilitarianism," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 467-81.
11. Hurka, pp. 11-23.
12. Ibid., p. 4.
13. Slote, p. 4.
14. Hursthouse, pp. 10-14.
15. Slote, pp. 4-7. Some recent work by Gilbert Harman and by John Doris has used psychological studies to suggest that we may be wrong to suppose that many people have broadly explanatory character traits in the neighborhood of the traditional virtues (see Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [1998-99]: 315-31; and Doris, Lack of Character). Ruth Benedict, in Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934) had made similar claims. She writes, "Recent important experiments dealing with personality traits have shown that social determinants are crucial even in the traits of honesty and leadership. Honesty in one experimental situation gave almost no indication whether the child would cheat in another. There turned out to be not honest-dishonest persons, but honest-dishonest situations" (p. 236). She goes on to claim that the experimental evidence suggests that honesty and leadership are by no means the only traits for which this is the case. For a response to such views, see Gopal Sreenivasen, "Errors about Errors," Mind 111 (2002): 47-68. See also Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character," in this issue.
16. Slote, pp. 4-7. Some recent work by Gilbert Harman and by John Doris has used psychological studies to suggest that we may be wrong to suppose that many people have broadly explanatory character traits in the neighborhood of the traditional virtues (see Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [1998-99]: 315-31; and Doris, Lack of Character). Ruth Benedict, in Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934) had made similar claims. She writes, "Recent important experiments dealing with personality traits have shown that social determinants are crucial even in the traits of honesty and leadership. Honesty in one experimental situation gave almost no indication whether the child would cheat in another. There turned out to be not honest-dishonest persons, but honest-dishonest situations" (p. 236). She goes on to claim that the experimental evidence suggests that honesty and leadership are by no means the only traits for which this is the case. For a response to such views, see Gopal Sreenivasen, "Errors about Errors," Mind 111 (2002): 47-68. See also Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character," in this issue.
17. Slote, pp. 4-7. Some recent work by Gilbert Harman and by John Doris has used psychological studies to suggest that we may be wrong to suppose that many people have broadly explanatory character traits in the neighborhood of the traditional virtues (see Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [1998-99]: 315-31; and Doris, Lack of Character). Ruth Benedict, in Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934) had made similar claims. She writes, "Recent important experiments dealing with personality traits have shown that social determinants are crucial even in the traits of honesty and leadership. Honesty in one experimental situation gave almost no indication whether the child would cheat in another. There turned out to be not honest-dishonest persons, but honest-dishonest situations" (p. 236). She goes on to claim that the experimental evidence suggests that honesty and leadership are by no means the only traits for which this is the case. For a response to such views, see Gopal Sreenivasen, "Errors about Errors," Mind 111 (2002): 47-68. See also Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character," in this issue.
18. Slote, pp. 4-7. Some recent work by Gilbert Harman and by John Doris has used psychological studies to suggest that we may be wrong to suppose that many people have broadly explanatory character traits in the neighborhood of the traditional virtues (see Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [1998-99]: 315-31; and Doris, Lack of Character). Ruth Benedict, in Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934) had made similar claims. She writes, "Recent important experiments dealing with personality traits have shown that social determinants are crucial even in the traits of honesty and leadership. Honesty in one experimental situation gave almost no indication whether the child would cheat in another. There turned out to be not honest-dishonest persons, but honest-dishonest situations" (p. 236). She goes on to claim that the experimental evidence suggests that honesty and leadership are by no means the only traits for which this is the case. For a response to such views, see Gopal Sreenivasen, "Errors about Errors," Mind 111 (2002): 47-68. See also Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character," in this issue.
19. Slote, pp. 4-7. Some recent work by Gilbert Harman and by John Doris has used psychological studies to suggest that we may be wrong to suppose that many people have broadly explanatory character traits in the neighborhood of the traditional virtues (see Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [1998-99]: 315-31; and Doris, Lack of Character). Ruth Benedict, in Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934) had made similar claims. She writes, "Recent important experiments dealing with personality traits have shown that social determinants are crucial even in the traits of honesty and leadership. Honesty in one experimental situation gave almost no indication whether the child would cheat in another. There turned out to be not honest-dishonest persons, but honest-dishonest situations" (p. 236). She goes on to claim that the experimental evidence suggests that honesty and leadership are by no means the only traits for which this is the case. For a response to such views, see Gopal Sreenivasen, "Errors about Errors," Mind 111 (2002): 47-68. See also Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character," in this issue.
20. Slote, pp. 4-7. Some recent work by Gilbert Harman and by John Doris has used psychological studies to suggest that we may be wrong to suppose that many people have broadly explanatory character traits in the neighborhood of the traditional virtues (see Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [1998-99]: 315-31; and Doris, Lack of Character). Ruth Benedict, in Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934) had made similar claims. She writes, "Recent important experiments dealing with personality traits have shown that social determinants are crucial even in the traits of honesty and leadership. Honesty in one experimental situation gave almost no indication whether the child would cheat in another. There turned out to be not honest-dishonest persons, but honest-dishonest situations" (p. 236). She goes on to claim that the experimental evidence suggests that honesty and leadership are by no means the only traits for which this is the case. For a response to such views, see Gopal Sreenivasen, "Errors about Errors," Mind 111 (2002): 47-68. See also Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character," in this issue.
21. Julia Annas, "Virtue Theory," in Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
22. Slote, pp. 4-5.
23. Ibid., p. 18.
24. Ibid., p. 5.
25. Ibid., pp. 18, 21, 74-76.
26. Ibid., p. 23.
27. Ibid., pp. 29-30, 36-37, 63-73.
28. Ibid., p. 66.
29. Ibid., p. 70.
30. Ibid., p. 72.
31. Ibid., p. 87; see pp. 85-87.
32. Ibid., p. 13.
33. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
34. As Slote says, actions "have to exhibit, express, or reflect [virtuous] states or be such that they would exhibit, etc., such states if they occurred, in order to count as admirable or virtuous" (p. 17).
35. Ibid., p. 70.
36. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
37. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
38. Hursthouse, pp. 166-67.
39. Ibid., p. 167.
40. Ibid., p. 170.
41. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
42. Ibid., p. 171.
43. Ibid., p. 177.
44. Ibid., p. 185.
45. Ibid., p. 185.
46. Ibid., p. 187.
47. Armas.
48. John McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics," in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 17. More recently, however, McDowell has argued that Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia "marks out, rather, just one dimension of practical worthwhileness" (McDowell, "Some Issues in Aristotle's Moral Psychology," p. 41 in his Mind, Value, and Reality). This makes room for the thought that actions that are required by virtue, while ideal with respect to eudaimonia, might yet cost the agent in other dimensions that matter. Yet about the eudaimonia dimension, McDowell claims that "when one sees an action as a case of doing well, the point one sees in it need not be independent of the delight one's upbringing has taught one to take in noble actions just as such" (p. 44). Although McDowell's words are not conclusive on this issue, we suspect that he means to employ a moralized conception of eudaimonia. He clearly claims that properly brought up people will see that other dimensions of worthwhileness cannot compete with eudaimonia over the question of what shape their lives should take. Notably, McDowell avoids claiming that the eudaimonia dimension will be seen by the virtuous person as trump with respect to benefit in the way he claims it is rightly seen by the virtuous person as trump when it comes to how one should live one's life.
49. John McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics," in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 17. More recently, however, McDowell has argued that Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia "marks out, rather, just one dimension of practical worthwhileness" (McDowell, "Some Issues in Aristotle's Moral Psychology," p. 41 in his Mind, Value, and Reality). This makes room for the thought that actions that are required by virtue, while ideal with respect to eudaimonia, might yet cost the agent in other dimensions that matter. Yet about the eudaimonia dimension, McDowell claims that "when one sees an action as a case of doing well, the point one sees in it need not be independent of the delight one's upbringing has taught one to take in noble actions just as such" (p. 44). Although McDowell's words are not conclusive on this issue, we suspect that he means to employ a moralized conception of eudaimonia. He clearly claims that properly brought up people will see that other dimensions of worthwhileness cannot compete with eudaimonia over the question of what shape their lives should take. Notably, McDowell avoids claiming that the eudaimonia dimension will be seen by the virtuous person as trump with respect to benefit in the way he claims it is rightly seen by the virtuous person as trump when it comes to how one should live one's life.
50. Hursthouse, p. 185.
51. Ibid., p. 185.
52. Ibid., p. 186.
53. Ibid., p. 187.
54. Foot seems content to establish only that "there is indeed a kind of happiness that only goodness can achieve" (Foot, p. 97). Foot, unlike McDowell, makes no claims about the unique importance of this kind of happiness.
55. Hursthouse, p. 193.
56. Foot, pp. 2-3.
57. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
58. Ibid., p. 16.
59. Hursthouse, pp. 200-202.
60. Ibid., p. 197
61. Ibid., p. 203.
62. This favoring of the species-level description seems to be built into the story right at the start. For example, Foot writes "plants and animals have what one might call an 'autonomous', 'intrinsic', or as I shall say, 'natural' goodness and defect that may have nothing to do with the needs or wants of the members of any other species" (Foot, p. 26, emphasis added). And "what distinguishes a [normative] Aristotelian categorical from a mere statistical proposition about some or most or all the members of a kind of living thing is the fact that it relates to the teleology of the species" (Foot, p. 33, emphasis added).
63. Ibid., p. 15, n. 14, pp. 28-29. Here and elsewhere Foot acknowledges a significant debt to Michael Thompson's "The Representation of Life," in Virtues and Reasons, ed. R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
64. Ibid., p. 15, n. 14, pp. 28-29. Here and elsewhere Foot acknowledges a significant debt to Michael Thompson's "The Representation of Life," in Virtues and Reasons, ed. R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
65. Foot, p. 40, n. 1.
66. Ibid., p. 17.
67. McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics," considers an interpretation of Aristotle's ergon argument very much along the lines of the views of Foot and Hursthouse. He writes, "What is the ergon of a thing? ... If that phrase is understood merely statistically, the required connection with the notion of excellence is not plausible. To underwrite that connection, we had better understand the ergon of an F as something like: what it is the business of an F to do. This paraphrase leaves it open that, for different substitutions for 'F', different sorts of considerations may be appropriate in justifying a candidate specification of the ergon of an F" (p. 12). McDowell holds that Aristotle rightly thought of his ergon argument as not capable of adjudicating most disputes about the proper function of man. McDowell seems to lean toward a reading of Aristotle in which he invokes a "'value-loaded' use of human nature." "Such an explicit mention of human nature would be a sort of rhetorical flourish, added to a conclusion already complete without it." McDowell's rejected alternative, then, would be that "the business of human beings is to be found in an independent, 'value-free' investigation of human nature" (p. 19).
68. Foot signals that this is not her understanding of her strategy. She appears to think her story about the evaluation of animals does not presuppose a story about the ethical evaluation of humans (see p. 36).
69. Hursthouse, p. 199.
70. Foot, pp. 33-34.
71. Ibid., p. 66. Hursthouse makes remarks that have the same upshot at pp. 206-7 of her book, but she merely claims that our ethical evaluations are focused on the human will or character rather than "physical aspects."
72. Foot, p. 79.
73. Hursthouse, p. 220.
74. Ibid., p. 222.
75. Ibid., p. 224.
76. Ibid., p. 193.
77. Ibid., p. 226.
78. It might be thought that Michael Thompson's paper, "The Representation of Life," to which both Foot and Hursthouse approvingly refer, might provide help here. But it seems to us that Thompson is mainly there arguing for the conceptual necessity of seeing a thing as belonging to a species or life form in order to see that thing as counting as alive. We are not persuaded, but, more to the point, we do not yet see how to use Thompson's claim as an argument for the normative importance of species membership.
79. Gary Watson, "On the Primacy of Character," in Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel Stateman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 26.
80. Foot, pp. 62-64.
81. Ibid., p. 35.
82. Philip Pettit maintains that something like the standard list of virtues applies to us because of certain very general capabilities we have. See his "Two Sources of Morality," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001): 102-28.
83. Foot, pp. 113-15.
84. Hursthouse, p. 28.
85. Hurka, p. 229. See also Christine Swanton, "A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action," Ethics 112 (2001): 32-52.
86. Hurka, p. 229. See also Christine Swanton, "A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action," Ethics 112 (2001): 32-52.
87. Hursthouse, pp. 70-71.
88. Ibid., pp. 78-79, 77.
89. This style of objection is due to Bernard Williams. See his reply to John McDowell in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Robert Johnson, "Virtue and Right," Ethics 113 (2003): 810-34. Oddly, Williams seems not to notice that his own brand of internalism is subject to similar problems. See Robert Johnson, "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 53-71. See also David Sobel, "Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001): 218-35.
90. This style of objection is due to Bernard Williams. See his reply to John McDowell in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Robert Johnson, "Virtue and Right," Ethics 113 (2003): 810-34. Oddly, Williams seems not to notice that his own brand of internalism is subject to similar problems. See Robert Johnson, "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 53-71. See also David Sobel, "Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001): 218-35.
91. This style of objection is due to Bernard Williams. See his reply to John McDowell in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Robert Johnson, "Virtue and Right," Ethics 113 (2003): 810-34. Oddly, Williams seems not to notice that his own brand of internalism is subject to similar problems. See Robert Johnson, "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 53-71. See also David Sobel, "Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001): 218-35.
92. This style of objection is due to Bernard Williams. See his reply to John McDowell in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Robert Johnson, "Virtue and Right," Ethics 113 (2003): 810-34. Oddly, Williams seems not to notice that his own brand of internalism is subject to similar problems. See Robert Johnson, "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 53-71. See also David Sobel, "Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001): 218-35.
93. This proposal follows Peter Railton's strategy in "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 5-29. Michael Smith adopts a similar approach in his The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 151-77.
94. This proposal follows Peter Railton's strategy in "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 5-29. Michael Smith adopts a similar approach in his The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 151-77.
95. Hursthouse, p. 82.
96. This formulation is from Slote, p. 5.
97. Ibid., p. 5.
98. Ibid., p. 17.
99. Ibid., p. 17.
100. Ibid., p. 33.
101. Ibid., p. 35.
102. Ibid., pp. 32-37. Slote does not discuss what he means by "expressing" a total motivation, so we are speculating based on remarks in the text. We should explain the qualification that requires an act to be caused in the "standard way." Consider an example, due to Donald Davidson, in which a rock climber releases his grip on a rope, causing his companion to fall, but does this as a result of nervousness caused by realizing that his total motivation includes, say, a strong love of his companion such that his life would be ruined if he let his companion fall. Presumably Slote would not view the climber's releasing his grip as expressing this total motivation.
103. Slote, pp. 15-16.
104. Hurka, p. 226.
105. Slote, p. 17.
106. Ibid., p. 33.
107. Ibid., p. 17.
108. Ibid., p. 57.
109. Ibid., p. 33.
110. Ibid., pp. 17-18.