Two sources of morality

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 102-128

  Pettit, Philip ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040623230     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052500002922     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. For a recent influential discussion of the concept-centered problem, see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Christine M. Korsgaard, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999): 1-29. My approach is rather different from hers, as I trace ethical conceptualization to a more social, and less reflective, origin; in this respect it is closer to the approach found in Gerald J. Postema, "Morality in the First Person Plural," Law and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1995): 35-64. For another different approach, one that involves many congenial themes despite supporting noncognitivism, see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
2. For a recent influential discussion of the concept-centered problem, see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Christine M. Korsgaard, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999): 1-29. My approach is rather different from hers, as I trace ethical conceptualization to a more social, and less reflective, origin; in this respect it is closer to the approach found in Gerald J. Postema, "Morality in the First Person Plural," Law and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1995): 35-64. For another different approach, one that involves many congenial themes despite supporting noncognitivism, see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
3. For a recent influential discussion of the concept-centered problem, see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Christine M. Korsgaard, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999): 1-29. My approach is rather different from hers, as I trace ethical conceptualization to a more social, and less reflective, origin; in this respect it is closer to the approach found in Gerald J. Postema, "Morality in the First Person Plural," Law and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1995): 35-64. For another different approach, one that involves many congenial themes despite supporting noncognitivism, see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
4. For a recent influential discussion of the concept-centered problem, see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Christine M. Korsgaard, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999): 1-29. My approach is rather different from hers, as I trace ethical conceptualization to a more social, and less reflective, origin; in this respect it is closer to the approach found in Gerald J. Postema, "Morality in the First Person Plural," Law and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1995): 35-64. For another different approach, one that involves many congenial themes despite supporting noncognitivism, see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
5. For a sketch of the cognitivist position I defend, see Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation," Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 178 (1995): 20-40; and Philip Pettit, "Embracing Objectivity in Ethics," in Brian Leiter, ed., Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a critique of expressivism and an indirect argument for cognitivism, see Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "A Question for Expressivism," Analysis 58, no. 4 (1998): 239-51.
6. For a sketch of the cognitivist position I defend, see Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation," Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 178 (1995): 20-40; and Philip Pettit, "Embracing Objectivity in Ethics," in Brian Leiter, ed., Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a critique of expressivism and an indirect argument for cognitivism, see Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "A Question for Expressivism," Analysis 58, no. 4 (1998): 239-51.
7. For a sketch of the cognitivist position I defend, see Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation," Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 178 (1995): 20-40; and Philip Pettit, "Embracing Objectivity in Ethics," in Brian Leiter, ed., Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a critique of expressivism and an indirect argument for cognitivism, see Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "A Question for Expressivism," Analysis 58, no. 4 (1998): 239-51.
8. For examples of this sort of approach, see S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jackson and Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation"; and Ralph Wedgwood, "Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms," Philosophical Review, forthcoming.
9. For examples of this sort of approach, see S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jackson and Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation"; and Ralph Wedgwood, "Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms," Philosophical Review, forthcoming.
10. For examples of this sort of approach, see S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jackson and Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation"; and Ralph Wedgwood, "Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms," Philosophical Review, forthcoming.
11. On design specifications, see Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 1; and Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
12. On design specifications, see Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 1; and Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
13. On design specifications, see Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 1; and Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
14. On this point, see Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Human Brain (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).
15. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), bk. III, chap. 2.
16. For a qualified defense of this sort of view, see Pettit, The Common Mind. For further elaboration of its implications, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Freedom in Belief and Desire," Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 6 (1996): 429-49; and Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
17. For a qualified defense of this sort of view, see Pettit, The Common Mind. For further elaboration of its implications, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Freedom in Belief and Desire," Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 6 (1996): 429-49; and Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
18. For a qualified defense of this sort of view, see Pettit, The Common Mind. For further elaboration of its implications, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Freedom in Belief and Desire," Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 6 (1996): 429-49; and Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
19. For an attempt to deal with some of the issues involved in this problem, see Pettit, The Common Mind.
20. On this claim, however, see ibid., chap. 2.
21. For more on this approach, see Philip Pettit, "A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions," Philosophical Studies 96, no. 1 (1999): 21-44.
22. On this point, see Victoria McGeer and Philip Pettit, "The Self-Regulating Mind," forthcoming in Language and Communication.
23. For discussion of this notion of virtual control, see Philip Pettit, "The Virtual Reality of Homo Economicus," The Monist 78, no. 3 (1995): 308-29.
24. I borrow this notion of fault-freedom from Huw Price, Facts and the Function of Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
25. G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957).
26. On this point, see Pettit and Smith, "Freedom in Belief and Desire."
27. Stephen Darwall, "Reciprocal Recognition: The Second-Person Standpoint in Moral Thought and Theory" (manuscript).
28. It would be entirely hypothetical under the story told in Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
29. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
30. On this point, see Pettit, A Theory of Freedom.
31. See Philip Pettit, "Realism and Response-Dependence," Mind 100, no. 4 (1991): 587-626; and Philip Pettit, "Terms, Things, and Response-Dependence," European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998): 61-72.
32. See Philip Pettit, "Realism and Response-Dependence," Mind 100, no. 4 (1991): 587-626; and Philip Pettit, "Terms, Things, and Response-Dependence," European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998): 61-72.
33. Peter Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
34. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
35. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
36. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
37. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
38. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
39. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
40. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
41. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
42. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal- and Shouldn't Be," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202-28; Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); R. M. Sainsbury, "Projections and Relations," The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133-60; and Peter Railton, "Taste and Value," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
43. For a modern development of the Humean approach, see, for example, Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Whereas Smith's approach gives prominence to the notion of an ideal point of view, however, it is arguable that Hume relied instead on the notion of a general point of view. For a fine case in support of this interpretation, see Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal."
44. For a modern development of the Humean approach, see, for example, Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Whereas Smith's approach gives prominence to the notion of an ideal point of view, however, it is arguable that Hume relied instead on the notion of a general point of view. For a fine case in support of this interpretation, see Sayre-McCord, "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal."
45. On obligations and rights, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978). On contractualism, see T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
46. On obligations and rights, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978). On contractualism, see T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
47. See Philip Pettit, "The Consequentialist Perspective," in Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). See also Philip Pettit and T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Consequentialism," Theoria (2000): 228-45.
48. See Philip Pettit, "The Consequentialist Perspective," in Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). See also Philip Pettit and T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Consequentialism," Theoria (2000): 228-45.