Internal reasons and the conditional fallacy

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 49, Issue 194, 1999, Pages 53-72

  Johnson, Robert N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039680297     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00128     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. See, e.g., M. Stocker, 'Desiring the Bad', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 738-53
2. C. Korsgaard, 'Skepticism about Practical Reason', Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), pp. 5-25, esp. pp. 17-20
3. M. Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 61-2
4. See R. Shope, 'The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy', Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1978), pp. 397-413
5. and 'Rawls, Brandt and the Definition of Rational Desires', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8 (1978), pp. 329-40
6. I borrow the 'A+' notation from P. Railton, 'Moral Realism', Philosophical Review, 95 (1986), pp. 163-207
7. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, 'Internal Reasons', in his Moral Luck (Cambridge UP, 1980), pp. 101-13, esp. pp. 102-5
8. and 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', in his Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge UP, 1995), pp. 35-44, esp. pp. 36-8
9. Cf. A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Harvard UP, 1990), pp. 18-22
10. and C. Rosati, 'Persons, Perspectives and Full Information Accounts of the Good', Ethics, 105 (1995), pp. 296-325
11. See, e.g., W.D. Falk, '"Ought" and Motivation', in his Ought, Reasons and Morality (Cornell UP, 1990), pp. 21-41, at pp. 36-9
12. R. Brandt, A Theory of the Right and the Good (Cambridge UP, 1979), pp. 10-23
13. Williams, Moral Luck p. 105
14. S. Darwall, 'Internalism and Agency', Philosophical Perspectives, 6 (1992), pp. 155-74, esp. pp. 164-5
15. But cf. D. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge UP, 1989), p. 58
16. D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford UP, 1986), pp. 21-59
17. T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton UP, 1972), pp. 3-12, 27-37
18. J. McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons?', in J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds), World, Mind and Ethics (Cambridge UP, 1995), pp. 68-85, at p. 69
19. G.F. Schueler, Desire (MIT Press, 1995), pp. 43-77
20. But cf. D. Parfit, 'Reasons and Motivation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 71 (1997), pp. 99-130, esp. p. 107
21. Cf. M. Smith and P. Pettit, 'Brandt on Self-Control', in B. Hooker (ed.), Rationality, Rules, and Utility (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 33-50, at p. 42
22. W.K. Frankena, 'Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy', in A.I. Melden (ed.), Essays on Moral Philosophy (Univ. of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81, at p. 80
23. Railton, 'Facts and Values', Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986), pp. 15-31, at p. 19
24. M. Smith, 'Internal Reasons', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), pp. 109-31, at p. 110
25. See my 'Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57 (1997), pp. 619-25
26. But cf. G. Sayre-McCord, 'Michael Smith's The Moral Problem', Ethics, 108 (1997), pp. 77-82
27. also S. Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford UP, 1984), esp. chs 5-6
28. See, e.g., Railton, 'Moral Realism' pp. 177-8
29. Rosati pp. 304-9
30. In correspondence. Also see his 'Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: a Reply to Swanton', Analysis, 56 (1996), pp. 160-8
31. and 'In Defense of The Moral Problem: a Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord', Ethics, 108 (1997), pp. 84-119, at p. 100