Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 113, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 223-234

  Fieseler, Karsten ^a   Kittsteiner, Thomas ^b   Moldovanu, Benny ^c  

^a MCKINSEY AND COMPANY   (United States)

^b NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Efficient trade; Lemons; Partnerships

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348207985     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00109-1     Document Type: Article

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