Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 87-109

  Arya, Anil ^a   Glover, Jonathan ^b   Rajan, Uday ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040199785     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2648     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Abreu D., Matsushima H. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: Complete information. Econometrica. 60:1992;993-1008.
2. Arya A., Glover J. A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings. J. Econ. Theory. 66:1995;507-521.
3. Arya A., Glover J., Young R. Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms. Games Econ. Behav. 9:1995;127-138.
4. Aumann R., Brandenburger A. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Econometrica. 63:1995;1161-1180.
5. Brusco S. Implementing action profiles when agents collude. J. Econ. Theory. 73:1997;395-424.
6. Cooper R. On allocative distortions in problems of self-selection. Rand J. Econ. 4:1984;568-577.
7. Demski J., Sappington D. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents. J. Econ. Theory. 33:1984;152-171.
8. J. Duggan, An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments, mimeo, University of Rochester, 1997.
9. Duggan J. Virtual Bayesian implementation. Econometrica. 65:1997;1175-1199.
10. Dutta B., Sen A. Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms. J. Econ. Theory. 64:1994;130-141.
11. Glover J. A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating. J. Econ. Theory. 62:1994;221-229.
12. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econ. 13:1982;324-340.
13. Jackson M. Bayesian implementation. Econometrica. 59:1991;461-478.
14. Jackson M. Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded mechanisms. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59:1992;757-775.
15. Jackson M., Palfrey T., Srivastava S. Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms. Games Econ. Behav. 6:1994;474-501.
16. Jansen M. Regularity and stability of equilibrium points of bimatrix games. Math. Oper. Res. 6:1981;530-550.
17. Ma C. Unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents. Rev. Econ. Stud. 55:1988;555-572.
18. Ma C., Moore J., Turnbull S. Stopping agents from "cheating" J. Econ. Theory. 46:1988;355-372.
19. E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, mimeo, MIT, 1977.
20. Mirrlees J. Optimal tax theory: A synthesis. J. Pub. Econ. 6:1976;327-358.
21. Mookherjee D. Optimal incentive schemes with many agents. Rev. Econ. Stud. 51:1984;433-446.
22. Mookherjee D., Reichelstein S. Implementation via augmented revelation mechanisms. Rev. Econ. Stud. 57:1990;453-475.
23. Mookherjee D., Reichelstein S. Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules. J. Econ. Theory. 56:1992;378-399.
24. Moore J. Implementation in environments with complete information. Laffont J. Advances in Economic Theory. 1992;Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
25. Myerson R. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica. 47:1979;61-74.
26. Palfrey T., Srivastava S. Implementation with incomplete information in exchange economies. Econometrica. 57:1989;115-134.
27. Palfrey T., Srivastava S. Bayesian Implementation. 1993;Harwood Academic, Chur.
28. Piketty T. Implementation of first-best allocations via generalized tax schedules. J. Econ. Theory. 61:1993;23-41.
29. Postlewaite A., Schmeidler D. Implementation in differential information economies. J. Econ. Theory. 39:1986;14-33.
30. Sjöström T. Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games. Games Econ. Behav. 6:1994;502-511.
31. Sjöström T. Implementation and information in teams. Economics Design. 1:1996;327-341.
32. Spence A. Multiproduct quantity-dependent prices and profitability constraints. Rev. Econ. Stud. 47:1980;821-841.
33. Tan T., Werlang S. The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games. J. Econ. Theory. 45:1988;370-391.