The positive effects of biased self-perceptions in firms

Review of Finance

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 453-496

  Gervais, Simon ^a   Goldstein, Itay ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649144001     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfm022     Document Type: Article

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