Ambiguity in partnerships

Economic Journal

Volumn 114, Issue 497, 2004, Pages 528-546

  Kelsey, David ^a   Spanjers, Willy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b KINGSTON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PARTNERSHIP APPROACH;

EID: 3242875903     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00230.x     Document Type: Article

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