Coexistence of strategies and culturally-specific common knowledge: An evolutionary analysis

Journal of Bioeconomics

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 165-194

  Antoci, Angelo ^a   Sacco, Pier Luigi ^b   Zarri, Luca ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SASSARI   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY IUAV OF VENICE   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VERONA   (Italy)

^d UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Culturally specific common knowledge; Evolutionary game theory; Prisoner's dilemma; Social dynamics; Subjective games

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; KNOWLEDGE; PRISONER DILEMMA; SUBPOPULATION;

EID: 4444343144     PISSN: 13876996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:JBIO.0000040371.20538.3f     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Andreoni, James & John Miller. 1993. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence. Economic Journal 103:570-585.
2. Antoci, Angelo & Pier Luigi Sacco. 1995. A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption. Journal of Economics 61:89-122.
3. Antoci Angelo, Pier Luigi Sacco & Stefano Zamagni. 2000. The ecology of altruistic motivations in triadic social environments. Pp. 335-351 in L.A. Gérard-Varet, S.C. Kolm & J. Mercier Ythier (ed.) The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, IEA Conference Volume. Macmillan, London.
4. Ayres, Ian. & Peter Siegelman. 1995. Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car. American Economic Review 85(3):304-319.
5. Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak & Jörgen Weibull. 1995. Evolutionary selection and rational behaviour. Pp. 343-363 in A. Kirman & M. Salmon (ed.) Learning and Rationality in Economics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
6. Beavis, Brian & Ian Dobbs. 1989. Optimization and stability theory for economic analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
7. Binmore, Ken. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume I: Playing Fair. The MIT Press, Cambridge.
8. Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson. 1992. Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. Journal of Economic Theory 57:278-305.
9. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Jörgen Weibull. 1994. Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation, mimeo. Delta, Paris.
10. Bomze, Immanuel. 1983. Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: a two-dimensional classification. Biological Cybernetics 48:201-211.
11. Boyd, Robert & Peter J. Richerson. 1980. Sociobiology, culture and economic theory. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1:97-121.
12. Boyd, Robert & Peter J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the evolutionary process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
13. Brown, Joel, Michael Sanderson & Richard Michod. 1982. Evolution of social behavior by reciprocation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 99:319-339.
14. Buchanan, James M. 2000. Group selection and team sports. Journal of Bioeconomics 2:1-7.
15. Camerer, Colin & Richard Thaler. 1995. Ultimatums, dictators, and manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:209-219.
16. Cooper, Russell, Douglas DeJong, Robert Forsythe & Thomas Ross. 1996. Cooperation without reputation: experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games. Games and Economic Behavior 12:187-218.
17. Douglas, Mary. 1982. In the active voice. Routledge, London.
18. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenaeus. 1989. Human ethology. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.
19. Ellison, Glenn. 1994. Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. Review of Economic Studies 61:567-588.
20. Eshel, Ilan, Emilia Sansone & Avner Shaked. 1999. The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals. International Journal of Game Theory 28:447-463.
21. Fehr, Ernst & Urs Fischbacher. 2002. Why social preferences matter - The impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. The Economic Journal 112:1-33.
22. Fehr, Ernst & Simon Gächter. 1999. Reciprocal fairness, heterogeneity, and institutions. Paper presented at the AEA Meeting in New York, 3-5 January 1999.
23. Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl. 1993. Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:437-460.
24. Furnivall, John S. 1957. Colonial policy and practice: a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India. New York University Press.
25. Geanakoplos, John, David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti. 1989. Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 1:60-79.
26. Goldschmidt, Walter. 1993. On the relationship between biology and anthropology. Man 28:341-359.
27. Granovetter, Mark. 1985. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510.
28. Güth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze. 1982. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3:367-388.
29. Heckathorn, Douglas. 1996. The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action. American Sociological Review 61:250-277.
30. Hirshleifer, Jack & Juan Carlos Martinez Coll. 1991. The limits of reciprocity. Rationality and Society 3:35-64.
31. Hofbauer, Josef & Karl Sygmund. 1988. The theory of evolution and dynamical systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
32. Kalai, Ehud & Ehud Lehrer. 1995. Subjective games and equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 8: 123-163.
33. Kandori, Michihiro. 1992. Social norms and community enforcement. Review of Economic Studies 59: 63-80.
34. Karandikar, Rajeeva, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray & Fernando Vega-Redondo. 1998. Evolving aspirations and cooperation. Journal of Economic Theory 80:292-331.
35. Landa, Janet T. 1981. A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group: an institutional alternative to contract law. Journal of Legal Studies 19:349-362.
36. Landa, Janet T. 1999a. Bioeconomics of some nonhuman and human societies: new institutional economics approach. Journal of Bioeconomics 1:95-113.
37. Landa, Janet T. 1999b. The law and bioeconomics of ethnic cooperation and conflict in plural societies of Southeast Asia: a theory of Chinese merchant success. Journal of Bioeconomics 1:269-284.
38. Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. A philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
39. Matsushima, Hitoshi. 1998b. Toward a theory of subjective games. Mimeo, University of Tokio.
40. Menicucci, Domenico & Pier Luigi Sacco. 1997. Evolutionary dynamics with λ-players. Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Florence.
41. Mueller, Dennis. 1986. Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior. Public Choice 51:3-23.
42. Ockenfels, Axel & Joachim Weimann. 1999. Types and patterns: an experimental East-West-German comparison of cooperation and solidarity. Journal of Public Economics 71:275-287.
43. Oechssler, Jörg & Burkhard Schipper. 2003. Can you guess the game you're playing? Games and Economic Behavior 43:137-152.
44. Palomino, Frédéric & Fernando Vega-Redondo. 1999. Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 28:465-488.
45. Rabin, Matthew. 1993. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83(5):1281-1302.
46. Rabin, Matthew. 2002. A perspective on psychology and economics. European Economic Review 46: 657-685.
47. Rapaport, Carol. 1995. Apparent wage discrimination when wages are determined by nondiscriminatory contracts. American Economic Review 85(5):1263-1277.
48. Roth, Alvin. 1995. Bargaining experiments. Pp. 253-348 in A. Roth & J. Kagel (ed.) Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
49. Rubin, Paul H. 2000. Group selection and the limits to altruism. Journal of Bioeconomics 2:9-23.
50. Rubinstein, Ariel. 1986. Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 39:83-96.
51. Sacco, Pier Luigi. 1994. Discussion of Björnerstedt and Weibull's 'Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation'. Pp. 172-181 in K.J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman & C. Schmidt (ed.) Rationality in Economics. Macmillan, London.
52. Sacco, Pier Luigi & Stefano Zamagni. 1996. An evolutionary dynamic approach to altruism. Pp. 265-300 in F. Farina, F. Hahn & S. Vannucci (ed.) Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behavior. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
53. Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. Stone age economics. De Gruyter, New York.
54. Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
55. Schlag, Karl Hermann. 1998. Why imitate, and if so, how? Journal of Economic Theory 78:130-156.
56. Schnabl, Wolfgang, Peter Stadler, Christian Forst & Peter Schuster. 1991. Full characterization of a strange attractor. Physica D 48:65-90.
57. Sen, Amartya. 1967. Isolation, assurance and the social rate of discount. Quarterly Journal of Economics 81:112-125.
58. Sen, Amartya. 1974. Choice, orderings and morality. Pp. 54-67 in S. Körner (ed.) Practical Reason. Blackwell, Oxford.
59. Smith, Peter & Michael Bond. 1993. Social psychology across cultures. Harvester, Hemel Hampstead.
60. Sober, Elliot & David Sloan Wilson. 1998. Unto others. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
61. Sugden, Robert. 1991. Rational choice: a survey of contributions from economics and philosophy. The Economic Journal 101:751-785.
62. Taylor, Michael. 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
63. Taylor, Peter & Leo Jonker. 1978. Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences 61:51-63.
64. Weibull, Jörgen. 1995. Evolutionary game theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge.
65. Weimann, Joachim. 1994. Individual behavior in a free riding experiment. Journal of Public Economics 54:185-200.
66. Wildavsky. Aaron. 1992. Indispensable framework or just another ideology? Rationality and Society 4:8-23.