The Law and Bioeconomics of Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict in Plural Societies of Southeast Asia: A Theory of Chinese Merchant Success

Journal of Bioeconomics

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 269-284

  Landa, Janet T ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Confucian code of ethics; Cultural group selection theory; Cultural transmission unit; Culture; Ethnically homogeneous middleman group; Group competition; Identity; Infrastructure; Institution; Moral systems; Public good externalities; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041939643     PISSN: 13876996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010054012108     Document Type: Article

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