Party cues and yardstick voting

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 470-477

  Geys, Benny ^a   Vermeir, Jan ^b  

^a WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

^b VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

D72; H30; H77; Party cues; Party labels; Spatial interaction; Yardstick voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 44149105165     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.02.003     Document Type: Article

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