The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs

Public Choice

Volumn 94, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 175-189

  Jones, Philip ^a   Hudson, John ^a  

^a University of Bath   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032331665     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004924417001     Document Type: Article

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