Uncertainty, difficulty, and complexity

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 115-149

  Page, Scott E ^a  

^a Center for the Study of Complex Systems   (United States)

Author keywords

Complexity; Diversity; Equilibrium; Institutions; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 43349103378     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807085815     Document Type: Article

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