Determinants of confirmation

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 14, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 877-883

  Tentori, Katya ^a   Crupi, Vincenzo ^a,b,c   Osherson, Daniel ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY IUAV OF VENICE   (Italy)

^c AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY   (France)

^d PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 37349121956     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/BF03194115     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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