Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 140, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 229-245

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Imhof, Lorens A ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Learning model; Limit distribution; Markov process; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 42949091271     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.002     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Benaïm M., and Hirsch M. Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games. Games Econ. Behav. 29 (1999) 36-72
2. Benaïm M., and Weibull J.W. Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games. Econometrica 71 (2003) 873-903
3. Binmore K., and Samuelson L. Muddling through: noisy equilibrium selection. J. Econ. Theory 74 (1997) 235-265
4. Björnerstedt J., and Weibull J. Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation. In: Arrow K., et al. (Ed). The Rational Foundations of Economic Analysis (1995), MacMillan, London
5. de Bruijn N.G. Asymptotic Methods in Analysis (1958), North-Holland, Amsterdam
6. Ellison G., and Fudenberg D. Word of mouth communication and social learning. Quart. J. Econ. 110 (1995) 93-126
7. G. Ellison, D. Fudenberg, L. A. Imhof, Random matching in adaptive dynamics, Mimeo, 2006.
8. Freidlin M.I., and Wentzell A.D. Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems. second ed. (1998), Springer, New York
9. Fudenberg D., and Imhof L.A. Imitation processes with small mutations. J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 251-262
10. D. Fudenberg, L.A. Imhof, Multi-dimensional muddling in large populations, Mimeo, 2006.
11. Fudenberg D., and Kreps D. Learning mixed equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993) 320-367
12. Fudenberg D., and Levine D. The Theory of Learning in Games (1998), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
13. Fudenberg D., and Maskin E. Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games. Amer. Econ. Rev. 80 (1990) 274-279
14. Fudenberg D., Nowak M.A., Taylor C., and Imhof L.A. Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation. Theoretical Population Biol. 70 (2006) 352-363
15. Imhof L.A., Fudenberg D., and Nowak M.A. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. Proceed. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 102 (2005) 10797-10800
16. Imhof L.A., and Nowak M.A. Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process. J. Math. Biol. 52 (2006) 667-681
17. Kandori M., Mailath G., and Rob R. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61 (1993) 29-56
18. Karlin S., and Taylor H.M. A First Course in Stochastic Processes. second ed. (1975), Academic Press, New York
19. Nowak M.A., Sasaki A., Taylor C., and Fudenberg D. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428 (2004) 646-650
20. Nowak M.A., and Sigmund K. Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature 355 (1992) 250-253
21. Samuelson L. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (1997), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
22. Sandholm W. Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution. Econ. Letters 61 (1998) 165-170
23. Traulsen A., Claussen J.C., and Hauert C. Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 238701
24. Young P. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61 (1993) 57-84