The sleeping policeman: Understanding issues of enforcement and compliance in conservation

Animal Conservation

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 75-82

  Keane, Aidan ^a   Jones, J P G ^b   Edwards Jones, G ^b   Milner Gulland, E J ^a  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b BANGOR UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Elephants; Gametheory; Institutions; Models; Poaching; Rules

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; DECISION MAKING; ELEPHANT; GAME THEORY; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; POACHING; SPECIES CONSERVATION;

ELEPHANTIDAE; LOXODONTA; LOXODONTA AFRICANA;

EID: 41549156023     PISSN: 13679430     EISSN: 14691795     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-1795.2008.00170.x     Document Type: Review

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