A model of compliance in fisheries: Theoretical foundations and practical application

Ocean and Coastal Management

Volumn 42, Issue 8, 1999, Pages 699-716

  Hønneland, Geir ^a  

^a FRIDTJOF NANSEN INSTITUTE   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MANAGEMENT; NATURAL RESOURCES; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

COERCIVE MEASURE; COMPLIANCE; DISCURSIVE MEASURE;

FISHERIES;

DECISION MAKING; FISHING INDUSTRY; MODELING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0033179889     PISSN: 09645691     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0964-5691(99)00041-1     Document Type: Article

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