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Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 107-138

CEO compensation and bank mergers

Author keywords

Banking; Compensation; G21; G34; Mergers

Indexed keywords


EID: 0035402415     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00057-5     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (300)

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