Which way does Ukraine face? Popular orientations toward Russia and Western Europe

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 54, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 43-58

  Munro, Neil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 38849093293     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216540604     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. "Western Europe" in this article refers somewhat loosely to the fifteen member states of the European Union before enlargement to include post-communist states. "Euro-Atlantic structures" refers to NATO countries, including Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. "The West" includes all of the above.
2. Victor Chudowsky and Taras Kuzio, "Does Public Opinion Matter in Ukraine? The Case of Foreign Policy," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003): 273-90 (www.taraskuzio.net/journals/pdf/ internationalpublic_opinion.pdf).
3. Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution," Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 2 (March-April 2005): 29-44;
4. Nathaniel Copsey, "Popular Politics and the Ukrainian Presidential Election of 2004," Politics 25, no. 2 (2005): 96-106 (www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j. 1467-9256.2005.00234.x);
5. Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
6. Taras Kuzio, ed., "Democratic Revolutions in Post-Communist States," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 283-430 (www. taraskuzio.net/journals/C&PCS_DemocraticRevolution.zip).
7. Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
8. Rick Fawn, "Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies," in Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies, ed. Rick Fawn (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 1-41.
9. Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," Daedalus 126, no. 3 (1997): 119.
10. Taras Kuzio, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future?" Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2006): 89-108 (www.taraskuzio.net/ journals/pdf/internationaleu_ukraine.pdf);
11. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine and the West," Survival 48, no. 1 (2006): 93-110.
12. Stephen Shulman, "Culture in Competition: Ukrainian Foreign Policy and the 'Cultural Threat' from Abroad," Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 2 ( 1998): 287-303.
13. For full results of the survey, see Richard Rose, Divisions Within Ukraine: A Post-Election Opinion Survey, Studies in Public Policy, no. 403, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, 2005; for details of the New Europe Barometer, see www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/nebo.shtml.
14. Paul Kubicek, "Regional Polarization in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behavior," Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 2 (2000): 273-94;
15. Stephen White, Ian McAllister, and Margot Light, "Enlargement and the New Outsiders," Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 1 (2002): 135-53.
16. European Commission, "Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and Council" (Brussels, November 8, 2006, COM[2006] 649 Final), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/ com_649_strategy_paper_en.pdf.
17. Paul Kubicek, "The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005): 265-92.
18. Valeriy Khmelko, "Stavlennia gromadian Ukraini shchodo ii vstupu do Evrosoiuzu i NATO t ikhnia otsinka svoei obiznanosti stosovno tsikh organizatsii" (Attitudes of Citizens of Ukraine Regarding Its Entry into the European Union and NATO and Their Obligations Toward These Organizations) (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 28, 2006), www. kiis.com.ua/txt/doc/27022006/nato.doc.
19. Eric A. Miller and Arkady Toritsyn, "Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States," Security Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): 325-63 (www.nipp.org/Adobe/FSST_A_123390.pdf);
20. Kuzio, "Kuchma to Yushchenko."
21. Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution.
22. Nikolai Sokov, "The Ukrainian Gas Crisis Revisited," Current History 105, no. 693 (October 2006): 348-51.
23. Robert Christensen, Edward Rakhimkulov, and Charles R. Wise, "The Ukrainian Orange Revolution Brought More Than a New President: What Kind of Democracy Will the Institutional Changes Bring?" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38, no. 5 (2005): 207-30.
24. Taras Kuzio, "The Orange Revolution at the Crossroads," Demokratizatsiya 14, no. 4 (2006): 477-94.
25. Kubicek, "Regional Polarization," p. 279.
26. Shulman, "Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification, " p. 53.
27. Ibid., p. 36.
28. Kubicek, "Regional Polarization," p. 281.
29. White, McAllister, and Light, "Enlargement and the New Outsiders," p. 197.
30. Stephen Shulman, "Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity," Political Geography 18, no. 8 (1999): 913-39;
31. Kubicek, "Regional Polarization," p. 281;
32. White, McAllister, and Light, "Enlargement and the New Outsiders," p. 197.
33. Kubicek, "Regional Polarization," p. 281.
34. White, McAllister, and Light, "Enlargement and the New Outsiders," p. 197.
35. Kubicek, "Regional Polarization," p. 281;
36. White, McAllister, and Light, "Enlargement and the New Outsiders," p. 197.
37. Shulman, "Culture in Competition."
38. Census data for the years 1897, 1932, 1959, and 1989 have been tabulated by Andrew Wilson in Ukrainian Nationalism: A Minority Faith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 22. The most recent data are from the 2001 census: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "About Number and Composition Population of UKRAINE by Data: All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001 Data" (2003-2004), www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality (Ukr.), www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality (Eng.).
39. Oxana Shevel, "Nationality in Ukraine: Some Rules of Engagement," East European Politics and Societies 16, no. 2 (2002): 392.
40. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 22.
41. Ibid., p. 23.
42. Among ethnic Ukrainians, comprising 81 percent of the sample, 46 percent chose Ukrainian, 42 percent chose Russian, and 11 percent were happy to use either. Among ethnic Russians, comprising 17 percent of the sample, 84 percent chose Russian, 9 percent chose Ukrainian, and 7 percent were comfortable in either language.
43. As an empirical test of the well-known regional divisions mentioned in the literature, outlier oblasts were defined as those oblasts whose mean foreign policy preference score was more than one standard deviation from the Ukrainian mean. The results of this procedure corresponded to the standard divisions, since they identified the oblasts of West Ukraine and Donbas as outliers.
44. According to the 2001 census, the city of Sebastopol is 71.6 percent Russian, while the surrounding Autonomous Republic of Crimea is 58.3 percent Russian. Survey results for the two are aggregated in Table 2.
45. Anatol Lieven, Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).
46. For the ranges, means, and standard deviations of all the influences tested in this study, see the Appendix.
47. William R. Klecka, Discriminant Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980).
48. The discriminant function analysis was conducted on the dependent variable reported in Figure 1 using as independent variables all the indicators listed in the Appendix. It produced a single dominant function explaining 79.4 percent of the variance and four minor functions explaining, respectively, 8.7, 5.4, 4.2, and 2.4 percent of the variance. On the dominant function, the reply "definitely CIS" had a group centroid score of-1.05, "probably CIS" had a score of -0.33, "all countries" had a score of zero, "both CIS and Western Europe" had a score of 0.16, "probably Western Europe" had a score of 0.68, and "definitely Western Europe" had a score of 1.19. One may conclude, therefore, that the variable has a single dominant dimension of variation, and that treating "all countries" and "both" as a single intermediate category is a valid procedure. Further details are available from the author.
49. Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods, 2d ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002);
50. Douglas Luke, Multilevel Modeling (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).
51. 2. He tested only regional, demographic, identity-based, and household economic independent variables. White, McAllister, and Light ("Enlargement and the New Outsiders") also tested the influence of social networks and travel in neighboring states and found some influence of the last on foreign policy preferences. Unfortunately, travel in neighboring states was not asked in the NEB survey.
52. In constructing the HLM model, a comprehensive HLM regression including all hypothesized influences was run first. Then all variables not significant at the 0.01 level for individual variables or the 0.05 level for aggregate variables were excluded, resulting in the parsimonious model in Table 3.
53. Future expectations of the national economy are not included as an influence because of its high correlation (0.50) with current evaluations.
54. The questions were: "Under the system of government we have had for the past dozen years, how much influence do you think people like yourself can have on government?" and "How many elected politicians care what people like you think?" Both items were measured on a four-point scale but were converted to a three-point scale to counteract the effects of skew. They correlate at 0.44.
55. According to the 2001 census, Donetsk was 57 percent Ukrainian and 38 percent Russian. The corresponding figures for Lugansk were 58 percent and 39 percent (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, About the Number and Composition of the Population of Ukraine).
56. For statistical reasons, in HLM the non-dummy variables in the model are converted to deviations from the mean for the entire sample. This procedure does not affect the range or the standard deviation of each independent variable.
57. Shulman, "Asymmetrical International Integration."
58. Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: State and Nation-Building (New York: Routledge, 1998);
59. Tor Bukkvoll, "Private Interests, Public Policy: Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement," Problems of Post-Communism 51, no. 5 (September-October 2004): 11-22;
60. Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Ukraine's Persistent Energy Crisis," Problems of Post-Communism 51, no. 4 (July-August 2004): 40-50.
61. Kubicek, "Regional Polarization in Ukraine"; Anna Makhorkina, "Ukrainian Political Parties and Foreign Policy in Election Campaigns: Parliamentary Elections of 1998 and 2002," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005): 251-67.
62. Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 129-31).
63. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy;
64. Shulman, "Culture in Competition";
65. idem, "Asymmetrical International Integration";
66. idem, "Cultural Comparisons and Their Consequences for Nationhood in Ukraine," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 2 (2006): 247-63.
67. Stephen Shulman, "National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine," Slavic Review 64, no. 1 (2005): 59-87.
68. Alfred Stepan, "Ukraine: Improbable 'Nation-State' But Possible Democratic 'State-Nation'?" Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 4 (2005): 279-308.
69. Shevel, "Nationality in Ukraine."
70. In the words of Adrian Severin, a member of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, as reported by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Brian Whitmore, "Ukraine: Did West Pull Up Stakes Too Soon?" (April 12, 2007), www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=04&y=20 07&id=7CE4B094-ADE6-4322-9A8C-BE42355A9674/.
71. Ray Taras, Olga Filippova, and Nelly Pobeda, "Ukraine's Transnationals, Far-Away Locals, and Xenophobes: The Prospects for Europeanness," Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 835-56.
72. Kubicek, " European Union and Democratization."