From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections and the orange revolution

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 29-44

  Kuzio, Taras ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 18444413276     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2005.11052197     Document Type: Article

References (83)

1. In November 2000, the Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz gave parliament excerpts of audiotapes made illicitly in President Leonid Kuchma's office by a presidential security guard, Mykola Melnychenko, who had recorded hundreds of hours of tapes between 1999 and 2000. The first tapes released by Moroz implicated Kuchma in the murder of Heorhiy Gongadze, an opposition journalist and joint editor of the Ukrayinska pravda Web site. An Interior Ministry spetsnaz unit kidnapped Gongadze on September 16, 2000, and his decapitated body was found in early November 2000. The unsolved murder cast a shadow over most of Kuchma's second term. Melnychenko fled to the Czech Republic and then to the United States prior to Moroz's public revelations. Both Melnychenko and Myroslava Gongadze, Heorhiy's widow, now live in Washington, DC.
2. The Constitutional Court ruled in December 2003 that Kuchma could run again, based on a ruling that his first term (1994-99) had begun before the adoption of the June 1996 constitution and therefore did not count. Numerous sources have confirmed that Kuchma found it difficult to contemplate the idea of leaving office.
3. Ukrayinska pravda (December 19, 2003).
4. In mid-December 2004, doctors at a prestigious Viennese clinic stated that Yushchenko had been poisoned with a high dose of dioxin, a poison similar to the active element in Agent Orange, the defoliant used by the United States in the Vietnam War. See Ukrayinska pravda (December 12, 2004)
5. and Chrystia Freeland, Stefan Wagstyl, and Tom Warner, "Viktor Suffered Things a Normal Person Could Not Survive," Financial Times (December 13, 2004).
6. AP (December 15, 2004).
7. AP (December 11, 2004).
8. I reported this conclusion in July 2004. See Taras Kuzio, "Is a Free Election Possible in Ukraine?" Eurasia Daily Monitor (July 13, 2004);
9. "Rising Abuse of State-Administrative Resources in Ukrainian Elections," Eurasia Daily Monitor (August 3, 2004);
10. "Falsification of Elections Already Under way in Ukraine," Eurasia Daily Monitor (September 27, 2004);
11. "Fraud Feared in Ukrainian Diaspora Voting," Eurasia Daily Monitor (October 15, 2004), all available at www.jamestown.org.
12. Interviewed by www.glavred.com on October 6, 2004.
13. Yanukovych promised the Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe reporters free elections; see Ukrayinska pravda (June 2, 2004).
14. Kuchma's "guarantees" were made in his state of the nation address to parliament (Ukrayinska pravda, March 17, 2004).
15. Interviewed by Die Welt (February 19, 2004), Kuchma said, "I will do everything I can to ensure that these elections will take place on the basis of honesty and transparent competition through a severe abiding of election legislation."
16. Washington Times (July 9, 2004).
17. Ukrayinska pravda (July 15, 2004).
18. Segodnya (March 9, 2004).
19. Interviewed by Zerkalo nedeli/Tzerkalo tyzhnia (October 23-29, 2004), Kivalov claimed he was interested in the elections being "held democratically, transparently, and legally."
20. Poll by Democratic Initiatives and Sotsis reported by Ukrayinska pravda (April 26, 2004).
21. Poll by the Razumkov Center (Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies) reported by Zerkalo nedeli/Tzerkalo tyzhnia (September 18-24, 2004).
22. Ukraiina moloda (July 8, 2004).
23. Ukrayinska pravda (December 14, 2004).
24. Anders Åslund of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimated that the Yanukovych campaign spent $600 million more than the amount officially reported to the Central Election Commission. Yanukovych's shadow campaign spent most of these illicit funds on dirty tricks. Half of the money came from Gazprom and other Russian businesses. Åslund cited these figures at a Carnegie Endowment seminar on Ukraine, Washington DC, November 23, 2004.
25. See the detailed expose of the "technical candidates" in Zerkalo nedeli/Tzerkalo tyzhnia (August 14-20, 2004).
26. See Taras Kuzio, "Yanukovych-Gate Unfolds After Ukrainian Elections," Eurasia Daily Monitor (December 3, 2004). The tapes are available at http://maidan.ia.net/audio.
27. Financial Times (December 13, 2004).
28. Independent (November 2, 2004).
29. During the Kuchmagate crisis, the Ukraine Without Kuchma and Stand Up Ukraine! movements organized protest rallies that attracted between 20,000 and 50,000 people. Kuchma ridiculed threats by the opposition to bring out 200,000 demonstrators on the streets of Kyiv. A leading member of PORA!, Yurii Poliukhovych, had said it could bring out half a million people (Kyiv Post, November 11, 2004). The threat materialized during the Orange Revolution, when the crowds reached a peak of 1 million.
30. The author attended a meeting in Kyiv on November 21, 2004, only halfway through election day, where the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe, European Union, National Democratic Institute, and observers from Eastern Europe and Ukraine all reported massive fraud far worse than in round one. Senator Richard Lugar, President George W. Bush's representative during the second round, attended the meeting but did not speak. The meeting reflected the negative assessment of round two by Western governments and organizations that was to become evident later in the week.
31. Kuchma had himself been prime minister in 1992-93 before going on to win the presidency in 1994. The post of parliamentary speaker was less useful in winning elections, as shown by the failed attempts of Ivan Pliushch in 1994 and Oleksandr Tkachenko in 1999.
32. One of the many anecdotes that circulated asked, "Why are relations between prison inmates improving? Because their cellmate may be the next president!"
33. Everywhere in Kyiv I heard "Eta bandyt!" or "Vin ye bandyt!" when Yanukovych was mentioned. Yanukovych served time in prison in 1968-70 and 1970-72.
34. The analogy with Russia would be for the governor of the Russian Far East to run for president.
35. See www.eggs.net.ua, which is replete with egg jokes.
36. See Daniel Williams, "Ukraine Rockers Set Protest to Their Unique Beat," Washington Post (December 11, 2004);
37. Yana Dlugy, "Accidental Anthem Keeps Kiev Streets Rocking," Agence France-Presse (December 14, 2004).
38. "Together we are many! We will not be defeated!" became an important slogan that helped overcome fear among Ukrainians who, as opinion polls had repeatedly shown, who lacked efficacy and felt powerless vis-à-vis the officialdom. Many people were energized by the large numbers on Kyiv's "Majdan," the heart of the Orange Revolution.
39. Daniel Williams, "Revolutionary Love," Washington Post (December 9, 2004).
40. For background, see Taras Kuzio, "Former Party-of-Power Divided Over Supporting Yanukovych," Eurasia Daily Monitor (July 19, 2004).
41. Oleksandr Zinchenko, head of the Yushchenko campaign, gives considerable credit to Kyiv's mayor and state administration (www.razom.org.ua, December 15, 2004).
42. Ukrayinska pravda (December 13, 14, 2004).
43. Rumors in Kyiv in the summer of 2003 claimed that Yanukovych and Medvedchuk had resorted to fisticuffs in the presidential administration. Medvedchuk does not get along well with most of the centrists, including the parliamentary speaker, Lytvyn.
44. See Yulia Mosytova in Zerkalo nedeli/Tzerkalo tyzhnia (December 4-10, 2004).
45. See Taras Kuzio, "What Do Ukrainians Really Think of Yanukovych?" Eurasia Daily Monitor (July 29, 2004).
46. Poland's ambassador to Ukraine, Marek Sliukovsky, was dumb-founded by Yanukovych's assertion that the assistance of Poland and the EU in brokering a round-table compromise was "interference" in Ukraine's internal affairs (Ukrayinska pravda, December 15, 2004).
47. Washington Post (December 9, 2004).
48. See Mark Franchetti and Askold Krushelnycky, "Kiev's Strongman Seeks Immunity," The Times (December 5, 2004).
49. For background, see Taras Kuzio, "The Fear That Drives Him," Transitions Online (October 2, 2003), available at www.tol.cz.
50. See Taras Kuzio, "What Now for Leonid Kuchma?" Eurasia Daily Monitor (November 19, 2004).
51. Most of the facts pertaining to the Gongadze affair have long been known. See Taras Kuzio, "Did Ukrainian Death Squads Commit Political Murders?" RFE/RL Newsline (August 22, 2002)
52. and "Is Ukraine Any Nearer The Truth on Gongadze's Murder?" RFE/RL Media Matters (February 28, 2003).
53. Interviewed by Novyi Kanal television, December 9, 2004.
54. For a more detailed background, see Taras Kuzio, "Russian and Ukrainian Authorities Resort to Inter-Ethnic Violence to Block Yushchenko, " Eurasia Daily Monitor (June 29, 2004)
55. and "Russia and State-Sponsored Terrorism in Ukraine," Eurasia Daily Monitor (September 22 and 23, 2004)
56. This has to be taken with a pinch of salt, as Pogrebynsky was heavily involved in the production of temnyky - secret censorship instructions from the presidential administration to TV stations. Pogrebynsky's comment was made during an interview on 1+1 television on December 15, 2004. For background, see Taras Kuzio, "Prime Minister Yanukovych and Media Freedom" and "Television Coverage Highly Biased in Ukraine Election Campaign," Eurasia Daily Monitor (August 11 and 12, 2004).
57. Interfax-Ukraine (October 11, 2004).
58. I argued this already in Ukraine: State and Nation Building (New York: Routledge, 1998). See the chapter dealing with regionalism.
59. Ukrayinska pravda (December 15, 2004).
60. See Taras Kuzio, "Deep Contradictions Cloud Yanukovych's Foreign Policy," Eurasia Daily Monitor (November 12, 2004).
61. Richard Holbrooke, the former U.S. ambassador to NATO, saw the Orange Revolution as paving the way for Ukraine to obtain a Membership Action Plan from NATO as early as the December 2005 NATO ministerial meeting. See his "From Tent City to NATO," Washington Post (December 14, 2004).
62. The EU might require more prodding than NATO on Ukraine. See Taras Kuzio, "Orange Revolution Exposes EU's Deficient Ukraine Policy," Eurasia Daily Monitor (December 13, 2004).
63. The spontaneity and voluntary participation of the Orange Revolution's demonstrators should be contrasted with the payment of a flat $100 per diem and transportation costs to the supporters sent to Kyiv by Yanukovych. Some of them defected to the Orange Revolution, while others used the $100 to have a good time getting drunk and then return to Donetsk. Alcohol was banned from the Orange Revolution's tent city.
64. See Taras Kuzio, "Security Forces Begin to Defect to Viktor Yushchenko," Eurasia Daily Monitor (December 1, 2004).
65. Stefan Wagstyl, Chrystia Freeland, and Tom Warner, "Ukraine Resident Spurned Yanukovych Pressure to Use Troops to Quell Protestors," Financial Times (December 14, 2004).
66. See Mykola Riabchouk, "Civil Society and Nation Building in Ukraine," in Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 81-98;
67. Taras Kuzio, "National Identity and Democratic Transition in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Belarus: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective," East European Perspectives 4, nos. 15-16 (July 24 and August 7, 2002)
68. and "The National Factor in Ukraine's Quadruple Transition," Contemporary Politics 6, no. 2 (June 2000): 143-64.
69. For background, see Taras Kuzio, "NGOs and Civil Society Under Attack in Ukraine," Eurasia Daily Monitor (May 26, 2004);
70. "Ukrainian Authorities Target Student and Youth Election Monitoring Groups," Eurasia Daily Monitor (October 13, 2004);
71. "Ukrainian Crack Down on Youth Groups Ahead of Elections," Eurasia Daily Monitor (October 20, 2004).
72. For background, see Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials Increasingly Denounce Opposition as 'Extremists' and 'Terrorists,'" Eurasia Daily Monitor (September 30, 2004).
73. "Radical" here is not meant to imply any negativity. PORA! has always advocated non-violence. It is closer in spirit to the right-populist Tymoshenko and has therefore advocated, and continues to advocate, a more "radical" alternative to the former Kuchma regime than the moderate Yushchenko and his pragmatic business supporters in Our Ukraine. PORA! members do not regard the label "radical" as incorrect (interview with PORA! activists, Kyiv, December 25, 2004).
74. Interviewed by Novyi Kanal television, December 9, 2004.
75. Razumkov poll cited by Ukrayinska pravda (November 24, 2004).
76. Ukrayinska pravda (November 30, 2004).
77. How did Putin know three days before the official results were released that Yanukovych had won the elections?
78. See Taras Kuzio, "International Community Denounces Mass Election Fraud in Ukraine as CIS Upholds Official Results," Eurasia Daily Monitor (November 24, 2004).
79. See Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
80. Viktor Yushchenko, "Ukrainians Have Won the Right to Choose Their Destiny," Financial Times (December 28, 2004).
81. A popular song of the Orange Revolution by Rusava was entitled "Nasha Ukrayina." The song repeatedly emphasizes, "This is our country, our native Ukraine."
82. See Taras Kuzio, "Yushchenko Victory to Speed up Ukraine's Democratization and Europeanization," Eurasia Daily Monitor (December 17, 2004).
83. Channel 5 TV, December 27, 2004.