Compensation for managers with career concerns: The role of stock options in optimal contracts

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 11, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 229-251

  Nohel, Tom ^a   Todd, Steven ^a  

^a LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Career concerns; Executive compensation; Pay for performance; Stock options

Indexed keywords

EID: 12344254951     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00047-6     Document Type: Article

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