Incomplete Contracts. Non-Contractible Quality, and Renegotiation

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2001, Pages

  Lülfesmann, Christoph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Hold Up Problem; Incomplete Contracts; Non contractible Quality

Indexed keywords

EID: 38749130227     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1017     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. and P. Rey (1994): Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information, Econometrica, 62: 257-282.
2. Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1994): The Management of Innovation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 1185-1209.
3. Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997): Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, Journal of Political Economy, 105: 1-29.
4. Che, Y.-K. and T.-Y. Chung (1998): Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments, RAND Journal of Economics, 30: 84-105.
5. Che, Y.-K. and D.B. Hausch (1999): Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, American Economic Review, 89: 125-147.
6. Chung, T.-Y. (1991): Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments and Risk Sharing, Review of Economic Studies, 58: 1031-1042.
7. Edlin, A. and B. Hermalin (2000): Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16: 395-423.
8. Edlin, A. and S. Reichelstein (1996): Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, American Economic Review, 86: 478-501.
9. Hart, O. (1995): Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
10. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1988): Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, Econometrica, 56: 755-785.
11. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1999): Foundations for Incomplete Contracts, Review of Economic Studies, 66: 115-138.
12. Hermalin, B.E. and M.L. Katz (1993): Judicial Modifications of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9: 230-255.
13. Holmström, B. and J. Tirole (1989): The Theory of the Firm, in: R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig, ed.: Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol.1.
14. Lülfesmann, C. (1996): Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation in Long-Term Trade Relationships, unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Bonn.
15. MacLeod, B. and J. Malcomson (1993): Investments, Hold-Up, and the Form of Market Contract, American Economic Review, 83: 811-837.
16. Malcomson, J. (1997): Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets, Journal of Economic Literature, 35(4): 1916-1957.
17. Maskin, E. and J. Moore (1999): Implementation and Renegotiation, Review of Economic Studies, 66: 39-56.
18. Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1999a): Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, Review of Economic Studies, 66: 83-114.
19. Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1999b): Two Remarks on the Property Rights Literature, Review of Economic Studies, 66: 139-149.
20. Nöldeke, G. and K.M. Schmidt (1995): Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem, RAND Journal of Economics, 26: 163-179.
21. Segal, I. (1999): Complexity and Renegotiations: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, Review of Economic Studies, 66: 57-82.
22. Segal, I. and M.D. Whinston (2000): The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk-Sharing), Econometrica, forthcoming.
23. Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1984): Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica, 52: 1351-1364.
24. Tirole, J. (1999): Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, Econometrica, 67: 741-781.
25. Williamson, O.E. (1975): Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York, The Free Press.