Causes and management of conflicts: 20th international seminar on the new institutional economics June 20-22, 2002, Wörlitz, Germany

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 159, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-15

  Engel, Christoph ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037361650     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456032974934     Document Type: Conference Paper

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