Why Iraq?

Defence and Peace Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-20

  Lowenberg, Anton D ^a   Mathews, Timothy ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Deterrence; Game Theory; Iraq; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749040301     PISSN: 10242694     EISSN: 14768267     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10242690701453685     Document Type: Article

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