Public safety and the moral dilemma in the defense against terror

Defence and Peace Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 347-364

  Franck, Raphaël ^a   Hillman, Arye L ^a,b,c   Krausz, Miriam ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Counter terrorism; Defense economics; Defensive pre emption; International judges; Profiling; Terror

Indexed keywords

EID: 26644448489     PISSN: 10242694     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10242690500207399     Document Type: Conference Paper

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