What directs a terrorist?

Defence and Peace Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 311-328

  Pittel, Karen ^a   Rübbelke, Dirk T G ^b  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b CHEMNITZ UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Impure public goods; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745986033     PISSN: 10242694     EISSN: 14768267     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10242690600554914     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Andreoni, J. (1986) Essays on Private Giving to Public. Goods. Michigan: UMI.
2. Andreoni, J. (1989) Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy 97 1447-1458.
3. Andreoni, J. (1990) Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving. The Economic Journal 100 464-477.
4. Akerlof, G.A. and Dickens, W.T. (1982) The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance. American Economic Review 72 307-319.
5. Azam, J-P. (2005) Suicide-bombing as inter-generational investment. Public Choice 122 177-198.
6. Breton, A. and Dalmazzone, S. (2002) Information control, loss of autonomy, and the emergence of political extremism. In Political Extremism and Rationality, edited by A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon and R. Wintrobe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Cornes, R.C. and Sandler, T. (1984) Easy riders, joint production, and public goods. The Economic Journal. 94 580-598.
8. Cornes, R.C. and Sandler, T. (1994) The comparative static properties of the impure public good model. Journal of Public Economics 54 403-421.
9. Drakos, K. (2004) Terrorism-induced structural shifts in financial risk: airline stocks in the Aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks. European Journal of Political Economy 20 435-446.
10. Dubin, J.A. and Navarro, P. (1988) How Markets for impure public goods organize: the case of household refuse collection. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4 217-242.
11. Eldor, R. and Melnick, R. (2004) Financial markets and terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy 20 367-386.
12. Erey, B.S. and Lüchinger, S. (2003) How to tight terrorism: alternatives to deterrence. Defence and Peace Economics 14 237-249.
13. Gupta, S., Clements, B., Bhattacharya, R. and Chakravarti, S. (2004) Fiscal consequences of armed conflict and terrorism in low- and middle-income countries. European Journal of Political Economy 20 403-421.
14. Hardin, R. (2002) The crippled Epistemology of extremism. In Political Extremism and Rationality, edited by A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon and R Wintrobe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism London: Victor Gollancz.
16. Kaplan, A. (1978) The psychodynamics of terrorism. Terrorism 1 237-254
17. Kirk, R.M. (1983) Political terrorism and the size of government: a positive institutional analysis of violent political activity. Public Choice 40 41-52.
18. Konrad, K.A. (2004) The investment problem in terrorism. Economica 71 449-459.
19. Kruegcr, A. and Maleckova, J. (2003) Education, poverty, political violence, and terrorism: is there a causal connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 119-144.
20. Lancaster, K. (1971) Consumer Demand: A New Approach. New York: Columbia University Press.
21. Pape, R.A. (2003) The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science Review 97 343-361.
22. Rapoport, D.C. (1984) Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions. American Political Science Review 78 658-677.
23. Rübbelke, D.T.G. (2005) Differing motivations for terrorism. Defence and Peace Economics 16 19-27.
24. Sandler, T. (1996) A game-theoretic analysis of carbon emissions. In The Political Economy of Environmental Protection - Analysis and Evidence, edited by R.D. Congleton. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 251-272.
25. Sandler, T. (2003) Collective action and transnational terrorism. The World Economy 26 779-802.
26. Sandler, T. and Murdoch, J.C. (1990) Nash-Cournot or Lindahl behavior? An empirical test for the NATO allies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 875-894.
27. Sandler, T. and Hartley, K. (2001) Economics o alliances: the Lessons for collective action. Journal of Economic Literature XXXIX 869-896.
28. Siqueira, K. (2003) Conflict and third-party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics 14 389-400.
29. Skaperdas, S. (1996) Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7 283-290.
30. Wintrobe, R. (2006) Can suicide bombers be rational? Forthcoming in Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.