New evidence on the origins of corporate crime

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 421-435

  Alexander, Cindy R ^a   Cohen, Mark A ^b  

^a United States Department of Justice   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85040474820     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199607)17:4<421::AID-MDE771>3.0.CO;2-U     Document Type: Article

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