Comparing alternative explanations for accounting risk-return relations

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 463-482

  Deephouse, David L ^a   Wiseman, Robert M ^b  

^a LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Behavioral theory of the firm; D81; Implicit contracts theory; Risk return

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042229405     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00100-1     Document Type: Article

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