Rent shifting and the order of negotiations

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 1109-1125

  Marx, Leslie M ^a   Shaffer, Greg ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Principal agent; Rent shifting; Vertical contracting

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; PURCHASING;

BARGAINING; PRINCIPAL AGENT; RENT SHIFTING; VERTICAL CONTRACTING;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 34848917326     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.03.001     Document Type: Article

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