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Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 64-82

Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda

Author keywords

Agenda; Bargaining

Indexed keywords


EID: 0002092620     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0710     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (83)

References (16)
  • 1
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    • Avery, C.1    Zemsky, P.B.2
  • 2
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    • Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference
    • Bac M., Raff H. Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference. Games Econ. Behav. 13:1996;125-134.
    • (1996) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.13 , pp. 125-134
    • Bac, M.1    Raff, H.2
  • 3
    • 0000679438 scopus 로고
    • The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
    • Binmore K. G., Rubinstein A., Wolinsky A. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling. Rand J. Econ. 17:1986;176-187.
    • (1986) Rand J. Econ. , vol.17 , pp. 176-187
    • Binmore, K.G.1    Rubinstein, A.2    Wolinsky, A.3
  • 6
    • 0000976784 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations
    • Busch L. A., Horstmann I. A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations. Games Econ. Behav. 19:1997c;144-148.
    • (1997) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.19 , pp. 144-148
    • Busch, L.A.1    Horstmann, I.2
  • 8
    • 0030099254 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems
    • Conley J. P., Wilkie S. An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems. Games Econ. Behav. 13:1996;26-38.
    • (1996) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.13 , pp. 26-38
    • Conley, J.P.1    Wilkie, S.2
  • 9
    • 0000974758 scopus 로고
    • Alternating Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit
    • van Damme E., Selten R., Winter E. Alternating Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit. Games Econ. Behav. 2:1990;188-201.
    • (1990) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.2 , pp. 188-201
    • Van Damme, E.1    Selten, R.2    Winter, E.3
  • 10
    • 0000491614 scopus 로고
    • Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents
    • Fernandez R., Glazer J. Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents. Amer. Econ. Rev. 81:1991;240-252.
    • (1991) Amer. Econ. Rev. , vol.81 , pp. 240-252
    • Fernandez, R.1    Glazer, J.2
  • 11
    • 38249018278 scopus 로고
    • The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining
    • Fershtman C. The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining. Games and Econ. Behav. 2:1990;224-238.
    • (1990) Games and Econ. Behav. , vol.2 , pp. 224-238
    • Fershtman, C.1
  • 14
    • 0042970946 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Multiple-issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions
    • Ponsati C., Watson J. Multiple-issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions. Int. J. Game Theory. 1996.
    • (1996) Int. J. Game Theory
    • Ponsati, C.1    Watson, J.2
  • 15
    • 0003019549 scopus 로고
    • Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
    • Rubinstein A. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica. 50:1982;97-110.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 97-110
    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 16
    • 0001094692 scopus 로고
    • Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
    • Shaked A., Sutton J. Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica. 52:1984;1351-1364.
    • (1984) Econometrica , vol.52 , pp. 1351-1364
    • Shaked, A.1    Sutton, J.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.