Strategic debt restructuring

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 985-1015

  Noe, Thomas H ^a   Wang, Jun ^b  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SAS INSTITUTE INC   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034550893     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/13.4.985     Document Type: Article

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