Safety and epistemic luck

Synthese

Volumn 158, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 303-313

  Hiller, Avram ^a   Neta, Ram ^b  

^a WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

Author keywords

Duncan Pritchard; Epistemic luck; Gettier; Knowledge; Safety

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748812482     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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