Bias in jury selection: Justifying prohibited peremptory challenges

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 467-479

  Norton, Michael I ^a   Sommers, Samuel R ^b   Brauner, Sara ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Biases; Gender bias; Jurors; Prosecutors

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548855393     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.571     Document Type: Article

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