Altruistic punishment in politics and life sciences: Climbing the same mountain in theory and practice

Perspectives on Politics

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 489-501

  Smirnov, Oleg ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547965745     PISSN: 15375927     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071502     Document Type: Article

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