Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation

Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 430-446

  Genicot, Garance ^a   Ray, Debraj ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547332292     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614385.015     Document Type: Chapter

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