Group formation in risk-sharing arrangements

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 87-113

  Genicot, Garance ^a   Ray, Debraj ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 0037242541     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00238     Document Type: Article

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