Do human rights violations cause internal conflict?

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 674-705

  Thoms, Oskar N T ^a   Ron, James ^b  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK; CIVIL RIGHTS; DEMOCRATIZATION; HUMAN RIGHTS; LANGUAGE; POLITICAL CONFLICT; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; RISK FACTOR;

EID: 34347207844     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2007.0034     Document Type: Article

References (349)

1. Many statistical studies of human rights violations control for internal conflict or civil war, and, finding an association, some consider this evidence that the internal conflict leads to human rights violations. Few studies, however, model their analyses in such a way that this causation can be inferred. For statistical studies that control for prior civil war, and find this effect on repression of personal integrity rights, see Shannon Lindsey Blanton, Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression?: Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries, 36 J. PEACE RES. 233 (1999);
2. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith & Feryal Marie Cherif, Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights, 49 INT'L STUD. Q. 439 (2005);
3. Erik Melander, Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse, 42 J. PEACE RES. 149 (2005). For studies that find an association between internal conflict and repression of personal integrity without determining whether war occurred before abuses,
4. see Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL SCI. REV. 853 (1994);
5. Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999) [hereinafter Keith, ICCPR] (also finding this effect for civil liberties more generally);
6. Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate & Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291 (1999);
7. Sabine C. Zanger, A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-93, 37 J. PEACE RES. 213 (2000);
8. Linda Camp Keith, Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996): Are They More Than Mere "Window Dressing?", 55 POL. RES. Q. 111 (2002) [hereinafter Keith, Constitutional Provisions];
9. Christian Davenport, The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment, 48 INT'L STUD. Q. 539 (2004) [hereinafter Davenport, Democratic Pacification] (finding this effect for different combinations of repression of personal integrity and restrictions on other civil liberties);
10. Linda Camp Keith & Steven C. Poe, Are Constitutional State of Emergency Clauses Effective?: An Empirical Exploration, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 1071 (2004);
11. Christian Davenport & David A. Armstrong II, Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 538 (2004);
12. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005);
13. Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005) (also finding this effect for civil liberties). It is important to note, however, that all these studies include the lagged dependent variable in their statistical models; this means that part of the effect of prior internal conflict may be captured by the effect of lagged repression. The authors know of no statistical analyses examining the effect of internal conflict on economic and social rights; the reason for this is likely to be the lack of adequate quantitative indicators of respect for such rights, which is discussed below.
14. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset, 39 ]. PEACE RES. 615, 618-19 (2002)[hereinafter Gleditsch, Armed Conflict]. The present article generally refers to internal conflict, but includes both internal conflicts and internal wars in the graphs. In the survey, studies of civil war are included, and also considered is some research on large-scale political violence, which is measured by deaths (in the context of political action), but with no requirement of an organized opposition group. Different definitions matter enormously in statistical studies, often yielding very different findings. See, e.g.,
15. Nicholas Sambanis, What is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 814 (2004) [hereinafter Sambanis, What is Civil War?].
16. Gleditsch, Armed Conflict, supra note 2 at 619.
17. This article uses the PRIO/Uppsala data introduced in Gleditsch et al., supra note 2; the dataset and documentation are available at http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/. All intensity levels of internal conflict are combined("minor armed conflict," "intermediate armed conflict," and "war") into a single binary conflict indicator, and "internationalized" internal conflicts are not included. "The dataset is provided in a "conflict-year" format; one conflict-year denotes one distinct conflict per year per location, where location is coded at the country level. Thus, if a country experiences more than one conflict at a time, conflict-years exceed country-years.
18. For the same or similar trends as in Graph 1, see James D. Fearon & David Laitin, Ethnicity Insurgency, and Civil War, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 77 (2003);
19. James Fearon, Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?, 41 J. PACE RES. 275, 276 (2004);
20. Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004, 42 J. PEACE RES. 623, 625 (2005);
21. ANN HIRONAKA, NEVERENDING WARS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WEAK STATES, AND THE PERPETUATION OF CIVIL WAR 4 (2005,);
22. HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 23 (2005), available at http:// www.humansecurityreport.info/.
23. Fearon & Laitin, supra note 4. While highly variable from year to year, the overall trend did not change significantly over the decades. The authors report that, in absolute terms, the largest number of civil wars, thirty-one, began in the 1990s, followed by twenty-five in the 1970s. Id. Note that their definition of civil war is slightly different than the one outlined above: 1,000 persons killed over the course of the conflict, averaging at least 100 per year, and killing at least 100 on both sides. Id. at 76.
24. UPPSALA CONFLICT DATABASE (Uppsala Conflict Data Program online database, 2005), available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/ index.php.
25. See HIRONAKA, supra note 4, at 19-28 (exploring the nature and effect of interstate intervention);
26. id. at 130-31 ("[A]s many as 71 percent of the civil wars that have occurred since 1945 have involved support by an external power.").
27. Id. at 51. There is some evidence that recipients of arms transfers are also more likely to abuse personal integrity rights.
28. See Blanton, supra note 1.
29. See Fearon, supra note 4.
30. HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE, supra note 4, at 29-31, 34.
31. Id. at 128. International Rescue Committee surveys found 3.8 million excess deaths from August 1998 to April 2004, less than 2 percent of which were directly caused by physical violence.
32. Benjamin Goghlan, Richard J. Brennan, Pascal Nogy, Deavid Dofara, Brad Otto, Mark Clements, Tony Stewart, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey, 367 THE LANCET 44, 44 (2006).
33. See Hazem Ghobarah, Paul Huth & Bruce Russett, Civil Wars Kill and Maim People-Long After the Shooting Stops, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189 (2003);
34. Hazem Ghobarah, Paul Huth & Bruce Russett, The Post-War Public Health Effects of Civil Conflict, 59 SOC. SCI. MED. 869 (2004).
35. For statistical studies finding that civil war in the previous decade makes renewed war more likely, see Nicholas Sambanis, Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1), 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 259, 270-71 (2001) [hereinafter Sambanis, Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars];
36. Ibrahim Elbadawi & Nicholas Sambanis, How Much War Will We See?: Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 307, 320-21 (2002);
37. Mary Caprioli, Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict, 49 INT'L STUD. Q. 161, 171-73 (2005). For statistical studies that find civil war in the previous year makes renewed or continued conflict more likely,
38. see Tanja Ellingsen, Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?: Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After The Cold War, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 228, 240-42 (2000);
39. Erik Melander, Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict, 49 INT'L STUD. Q. 695, 710 (2005).
40. For the notion of such repertoires, see CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 143-222 (1978);
41. CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 45-50 (2003).
42. See Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates & Nils Petter Gleditsch, Toward a Democratic Peace?: Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 35 (2001);
43. Sambanis, Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars, supra note 13 at 275; Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563, 568-69 (2004);
44. Barbara Walter, Does Conflict Beget Conflict?: Explaining Recurring Civil War, 41 J. PEACE RES. 371, 379 (2004);
45. Caprioli, supra note 13;
46. Patrick M. Regan & Daniel Norton, Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 319, 330 (2005).
47. For this effect on political violence instead of civil war, see Demet Yalcin Mousseau, Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?, 38 J. PEACE RES. 547, 558-60 (2001).
48. See Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, 22 INT'L SEC. 54, 56 (1997);
49. JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT (2000);
50. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003);
51. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD (2003).
52. The notion of dangerous democratization is returned to below.
53. See, e.g., Elbadawi & Sambanis, supra note 13;
54. Fearon & Laitin, supra note 4; Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 15;
55. Nicholas Sambanis, Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War, 2 PERSPECTIVES POL. 259 (2004) [hereinafter Sambanis, Using Case Studies];
56. Sambanis, What is Civil War?, supra note 2;
57. Marie L. Besançon, Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides, 42 J. PEACE RES. 393 (2005);
58. Caprioli, supra note 13;
59. Melander, Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict, supra note 13.
60. Scholars have identified a statistical association between national poverty and corruption, and between inequality and corruption, but the causal relationships remain unclear. See, e.g., Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 136 (2005);
61. Xiaohui Xin & Thomas K. Rudel, The Context for Political Corruption: A Cross-National Analysis, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 294 (2004). The relationship between poverty and inequality is even less clear. Some researchers argue that corruption boosts poverty by impeding growth, exacerbating inequality, and degrading government services.
62. See Eric Chetwynd, Frances Chetwynd & Bertram Spector, Corruption and Poverty: A Review of Recent Literature (Jan. 2003) (on file with author).
63. See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 4.
64. See PRIO/Uppsala conflict data, supra note 4. GDP data is from WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2005, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GDP.pdf.
65. See Michael E. Brown, The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 571 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996);
66. Kurt Schock, A Conjectural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict, 40 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 98 (1996);
67. Kalevi J. Holsti, Political Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies, in WAR, HUNGER, AND DISPLACEMENT: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 239 (Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart & Raimo Väyrynen eds., 2000) [hereinafter Holsti, Political Causes];
68. JEFF GOODWIN, NO OTHER WAY OUT: STATES AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, 1945-1991 (2001);
69. Anne-Marie Gardner, Diagnosing Conflict: What Do We Know?, in FROM REACTION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UN SYSTEM 15 (Fen Osler Hampson & David M. Malone eds., 2002).
70. See Sambanis, What is Civil War?, supra note 2;
71. Sambanis, Using Case Studies, supra note 17;
72. Regan & Norton, supra note 15. 23
73. See Sambanis, Using Case Studies, supra note 17 at 271;
74. Christian Davenport, David A. Armstrong II & Mark I. Lichbach, From Mountains to Movements: Dissent, Repression and Escalation to Civil War (22 Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
75. See also Andreas Wimmer, Who Owns the State?: Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Post-Colonial Societies, 3 NAT. NAT'LISM 631 (1997) (making this point with respect to ethnic conflict). Civil wars may also be the result of a variety of escalatory processes, so that different causal mechanisms can lead to the same violent outcome.
76. See Davenport et al., supra.
77. See Sambanis, Using Case Studies, supra note 17 at 260; Besançon, supra note 17 at 394-400.
78. PETER R. BAEHR, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY IN PRACTICE 1 (1999).
79. Mac Darrow & Amparo Tomas, Power, Capture, and Conflict: A Call for Human Rights Accountability in Development Cooperation, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 471 (2005).
80. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (Resolutions, pt. 1), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
81. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
82. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
83. With the exception of the right to self-determination present in all three documents, this international bill of rights guarantees only individual rights. See UDHR, supra note 27;
84. ICCPR, supra note 28;
85. ICESCR, supra note 29.
86. UDHR, supra note 27, art. 7.
87. See ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2, ¶ 1;
88. ICESCR, supra note 29, art. 2, ¶ 2.
89. See UDHR, supra note 27, arts. 3, 5, 9-10, 13, 18-21.
90. These rights are also often referred to as physical integrity or (personal) security rights. See, e.g., David Cingranelli & David Richards, Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 407 (1999);
91. Welsley T. Milner, Steven C. Poe & David Leblang, Security Rights, Subsistence Rights, and Liberties: A Theoretical Survey of the Empirical Landscape, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 403 (1999).
92. See BAEHR, supra note 25, at 4.
93. See ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4, ¶ 2.
94. See Fiona Robinson, NGOs and the Advancement of Economic and Social Rights: Philosophical and Practical Controversies, 17 INT'L REL. 79 (2003).
95. See UDHR, supra note 27, arts. 22-23, 25-26.
96. ICESCR, supra note 29, art. 11.
97. Id. art. 12.
98. Id. art. 2.
99. See Darrow & Tomas, supra note 26, at 523-27.
100. Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 81, 82 (1998).
101. Both cases were decided on in 2001. See Darrow & Tomas, supra note 26, at 531-34.
102. See Audrey R. Chapman, A "Violations Approach" for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 23 (1996);
103. Leckie, supra note 43.
104. BAEHR, supra note 25, at 33.
105. See Leckie, supra note 43, at 122-23.
106. See Jonathan Goodhand, Enduring Disorder and Persistent Poverty: A Review of the Linkage between War and Chronic Poverty, 31 WORLD DEV. 629 (2003). ("Theoretical and empirical work has tended to treat the poor as an undifferentiated category.")
107. See Leckie, supra note 43, at 104-05; YASH GHAI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 37 (2001) (on file with author), available at http://www.unrisd.org (follow "Publications");
108. Arjun Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 837 (2002);
109. OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POVERTY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (2004) [hereinafter OHCHR] (on file with author), available at http://www.ohchr.org /english/issues/poverty/guidelines.htm;
110. Celina Romany & Joon-Beom Chu, Affirmative Action in International Human Rights Law: A Critical Perspective of Its Normative Assumptions, 36 CONN. L. REV. 831 (2004).
111. See Hans-Otto Sano, Development and Human Rights: The Necessary but Partial Integration of Human Rights and Development, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 734, 747 (2000);
112. Sengupta, supra note 49; Darrow & Tomas, supra note 26.
113. PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA 103 (1998).
114. For the link between structural violence and internal armed conflict, see also Caprioli, supra note 13.
115. JOAN M. NELSON, POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND CONFLICT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22 (1998) (on file with author), available at http://www.rbf.org/pdf/poverty.pdf.
116. Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict Sensitive Development in the 21st Century 19 (Sep. 2004) (on file with author).
117. See PRIO/Uppsala conflict data, supra note 4. HDI trend data from UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS: AID, TRADE AND SECURITY IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2005)[hereinafter UNDP], available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005. While the basic components have remained the same since the HDI's introduction in 1990, the quality of the composite data and the scaling of the component indexes has changed over time. Therefore, the UNDP warns that the HDI scores reported in the annual Human Development Reports are not comparable; recent reports, however, present newly calculated and comparable HDI trend data, in five year intervals, for comparison over time.
118. Another widely used indicator is the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), which combines literacy, infant mortality, and life expectancy rates, introduced in MORRIS DAVID MORRIS, MEASURING THE CONDITION OF THE WORLD'S POOR: THE PHYSICAL QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX (1979). This and other composite indices, including the HDI, have been criticized for poor theoretical foundations, arbitrary component weighting, scaling problems, and for mixing measures of means and ends.
119. See MARK McGILLIVRAY & FARHAD NOORBAKHSH, COMPOSITE INDICES OF HUMAN WELL-BEING: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2004) (on file with author), available at www.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2004 /rp2004-063.pdf. Since its inception in 1990, the HDI has been continuously revised to respond to these criticisms, and it now uses the notion of "human capability" as its theoretical foundation. More generally, it has been argued that possible indicators of respect for socioeconomic rights include life expectancy, infant and child mortality, caloric supply, malnutrition, access to water and sanitation, literacy, and education enrolment.
120. See Milner et al., supra note 34;
121. Clair Apodaca, Measuring the Progressive Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oct. 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.humanrights.uconn.edu/conf_2005.htm. All of these indicators, however, measure development outcomes rather than government policies and efforts, and it is the latter two which are the focus of most human rights treaties.
122. See Maria Green, What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062 (2001);
123. Apodaca, supra;
124. Audrey Chapman, The Status of Efforts to Monitor Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oct. 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.humanrights.uconn.edu/conf_2005.htm. To remedy this lack of appropriate indicators of respect for economic and social rights, some researchers suggest using expenditure data to assess compliance.
125. See, e.g., Apodaca, supra. Still others are developing a measure of government efforts for respect of social and economic rights, based on willingness and ability.
126. See, e.g., David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Measuring Economic and Social Human Rights: Government Effort and Achievement (10 Oct. 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.humanrights. uconn.edu/conf_2005.htm.
127. In the data for 2003 (for which UNDP, supra note 54, provides all component data), the HDI is highly correlated with all three indexed components, with correlation coefficients of more than 0.90. Further explored was the correlation with GDP per capita in particular. The correlation between non-indexed GDP per capita (in PPP) and HDI is somewhat less strong, at 0.75. Considering HDI trend data for all years available between 1975 and 2003, the correlation between HDI and GDP per capita (not expressed in PPP) is 0.69. Although there is variation, all of these correlation statistics are high.
128. See ERIC R. WOLF, PEASANT WARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1969);
129. SAMUEL POPKIN, THE RATIONAL PEASANT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL SOCIETY IN VIETNAM (1979);
130. Goodhand, supra note 48.
131. WOLF, supra note 57, at 290.
132. See Popkin, supra note 57, at 258. Popkin disagrees with Wolf in many respects, but they agree that the poorest peasants are not likely to initiate rebellion.
133. See Goodhand, supra note 48.
134. Gardner, supra note 21, at 19.
135. For the link between inequality and incidence of internal conflict, see TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL (1970);
136. Edward N. Muller, Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 47 (1985);
137. Edward N. Muller & Mitchell A. Seligson, Inequality and Insurgency, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 425 (1987);
138. Manus I. Midlarsky, Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1988);
139. Terry Boswell & William J. Dixon, Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 540 (1990);
140. Schock, supra note 21;
141. E. Wayne Nafziger & Juha Auvinen, Economic Development, Inequality War, and State Violence, 30 WORLD DEV. 153 (2002).
142. For the link between inequality and civil war duration, see Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler & Måns Söderbom, On the Duration of Civil War, 41 J. PEACE RES. 253 (2004).
143. See Mark Irving Lichbach, An Evaluation of "Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?" Studies, 41 WORLD POL. 431 (1989);
144. Christopher Cramer, Does Inequality Cause Conflict, 15 ]. INT'L DEV. 397 (2003);
145. Bethany Lacina, From Side Show to Centre Stage: Civil Conflict after the Cold War, 35 SEC. DIALOGUE 191, 197 (2004).
146. See Besançon, supra note 17, at 409. Other researchers also find that relative parity in resources leads to higher levels of political violence.
147. See Michelle Benson & Jacek Kugler, Power Parity Democracy and the Severity of Internal Violence, 42 J. CONFL. STUD. 196 (1998).
148. See Lichbach, supra note 62.
149. Cramer, supra note 62, at 400.
150. See Lacina, supra note 62, at 197-98.
151. These are also called "horizontal inequalities." See Francis Stewart, Tackling Horizontal Inequalities, in EVALUATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION 271 (Osvaldo N. Feinstein & Robert Picciotto eds., 2001);
152. Francis Stewart, Case Studies of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: An Introduction, in WAR, HUNGER, AND DISPLACEMENT: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 1 (E. Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart & RaimoVäyrynen eds., 2000) (hereinafter Stewart, Root Causes];
153. Frances Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict, in FROM REACTION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UN SYSTEM 105 (Fen Osler Hampson & David M. Malone eds., 2002).
154. See Cramer, supra note 62, at 409.
155. See, e.g., Schock, supra note 21; Nelson, supra note 52, at 26-27; Gardner, supra note 21; Lacina, supra note 62.
156. See, e.g., TED ROBERT GURR & BARSARA HARFF, ETHNIC CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS 77-96 (1994);
157. Brown, supra note 21; Wimmer, supra note 23;
158. Holsti, Political Causes, supra note 21;
159. Stewart, Root Causes, supra note 67.
160. See Ellingsen, supra note 13.
161. See, e.g., Wimmer, supra note 23;
162. Nafziger & Auvinen, supra note 61, at 159.
163. See Pranab Bardhan, Method in the Madness?: A Political-Economy Analysis of the Ethnic Conflicts in Less Developed Countries, 25 WORLD DEV. 1381, 1383 (1997);
164. Wimmer, supra note 23, at 636.
165. See Wimmer, supra note 23, at 644.
166. See SUSAN DELACOURT, JUGGERNAUT: PAUL MARTIN'S CAMPAIGN FOR CHRETIEN'S CROWN (2003).
167. Wimmer, supra note 23, at 650.
168. In some cases, affirmative action is pursued to pre-empt social unrest and violence. See Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities: The Concept and Practice of Affirmative Action, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 5, ¶ 35-38, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/15 (2001)[hereinafter ESCOR].
169. The anti-discrimination principle in international law prohibits the use of renewed discrimination in remedial measures. See id. ¶ 4. For an overview of the debate, see Donald P. Judges, Light Beams and Particle Dreams: Rethinking the Individual vs. Group Rights Paradigm in Affirmative Action, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1007 (1991); ESCOR, supra note 77.
170. Affirmative action in university admissions has recently sparked intense debate in the US. See Charles Lane, Affirmative Action for Diversity Is Upheld, WASH. POST, 24 June 2003 at A01;
171. Gregory Rodriguez, Demographic Changes Upset Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMES, 26 Jan. 2003 at M03.
172. See DeNeen L. Brown, Quebec's 'Tongue Troopers' Defend French, WASH. POST, 5 Apr. 2001 at A18.
173. See Robert W. White, From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 94 AM. J. SOC. 1277 (1989);
174. Boswell & Dixon, supra note 61;
175. KALEVI J. HOLSTI, THE STATE, WAR, AND THE STATE OF WAR 99-119 (1996);
176. Will H. Moore, Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 851 (1998);
177. Holsti, Political Causes, supra note 21;
178. GOODWIN, supra note 21;
179. Nafziger & Auvinen, supra note 61. Recent research finds that repression has an effect on civil war escalation which is conditional on its interaction with dissent.
180. See Davenport et al., supra note 23.
181. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 292.
182. Most statistical studies consistently find that repression of personal integrity rights in the previous year makes renewed repression more likely. See Poe & Tate, supra note 1;
183. Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683 (1995);
184. Christian Davenport, Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition, 43 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 92 (1999) [hereinafter, Davenport, Democratic Proposition];
185. Blanton, supra note 1;
186. Keith, ICCPR, supra note 1;
187. Poe et al., supra note 1;
188. Zanger, supra note 1;
189. Clair Apodaca, Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights after the Cold War, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 587 (2001) [hereinafter Apodaca, Global Economic Patterns];
190. David L. Richards, Ronald D. Gelleny & David H. Sacko, Money With a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 219 (2001);
191. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002);
192. Keith, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 1;
193. Keith & Poe, supra note 1;
194. Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 1;
195. Davenport, Democratic Pacification, supra note 1;
196. Bueno de Mesquita, supra note 1;
197. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 1;
198. Melander, supra note 1;
199. Neumayer, supra note 1.
200. See Davenport, Democratic Pacification, supra note 1;
201. Sambanis, Using Case Studies, supra note 17.
202. See Holsti, Political Causes, supra note 21, at 278.
203. See also Sambanis, Using Case Studies, supra note 17, at 271. ("[G]overnment repression typically leads to more opposition and violence.").
204. See Will H. Moore, The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 107 (2000).
205. See Mark Gibney & Matthew Dalton, The Political Terror Scale, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73 (David L. Cingranelli vol. ed., 1996) (4 POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1996)).
206. See Michael Stohl, David Carleton & Steven E. Johnson, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter, 21 J. PEACE RES. 215 (1984);
207. David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205 (1985);
208. David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002 (1987);
209. Mark Gibney & Michael Stohl, Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 151 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988);
210. Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120 (1991);
211. Steven C. Poe, Human Rights and the Allocation of US Military Assistance, 28 J. PEACE RES. 205 (1991);
212. Mark Gibney, Vanessa Dalton & Marc Vockell, USA Refugee Policy: A Human Rights Analysis Update, 5 J. REFUGEE STUD. 33 (1992);
213. Steven C. Poe, Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 147 (1992);
214. Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI Q. 322 (1993);
215. Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 18 INT'L INTERACTIONS 309 (1993);
216. Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During the Reagan Years, 75 SOC. SCI. Q. 494 (1994);
217. Poe & Tate, supra note 1;
218. Blanton, supra note 1;
219. Keith, ICCPR, supra note 1;
220. Poe et al., supra note 1;
221. Milner et al., supra note 34;
222. Steven C. Poe et al., The Continuity of Suffering: Domestic Threat and Human Rights Abuse Across Time, in PATHS TO STATE REPRESSION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Christian Davenport ed., 2000);
223. Zanger, supra note 1;
224. Apodaca, Global Economic Patterns, supra note 83;
225. Keith, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 1;
226. Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 1;
227. Davenport, Democratic Pacification, supra note 1;
228. Keith & Poe, supra note 1;
229. Wade M. Cole, Sovereignty Relinquished?: Explaining Commitment to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966-1999, 70 AM. Soc. REV. 472 (2005);
230. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT. ORG. 593 (2005);
231. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Right or Robust?: The Sensitive Nature of Repression to Globalization, 42 J. PEACE RES. 679 (2005);
232. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 1;
233. Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 1;
234. Melander, Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse, supra note 1;
235. Neumayer, supra note 1.
236. The data is available annually from 1976 onward. An analysis of the differences between PTS scores based on the two sources has found that while US State Department reports were "somewhat less harsh" than Amnesty reports for earlier years due to possible bias (i.e., the State Department reports favoring friends and trading partners of the US while discriminating against leftist countries), this difference is small, and more importantly, "the two reports have clearly converged in their assessments of human rights violations over time." Steven C. Poe, Sabine Carey & Tanya Vazquez, How are These Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 650 (2001).
237. For a conceptual critique of the PTS data, see James M. McCormick & Neil J. Mitchell, Human Rights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis, 49 WORLD POL. 510 (1997).
238. For other indicators of respect for personal integrity rights, based on the same descriptive sources but differently operationalized, see, for example, Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 34; Hathaway, supra note 83.
239. See conflict data from PRIO/Uppsala, supra note 4. PTS data from Mark Gibney, available at http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/ DOCS/Gibney/Political%20Terror%20Scale%201980-2005.pdf. PTS averages are rounded.
240. See Muller, supra note 61 at 48; Muller &, Seligson, supra note 61;
241. Boswell & Dixon, supra note 61;
242. Edward N. Muller & Erich Weede, Cross-national Variations in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach, 34 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 624 (1990);
243. Schock, supra note 21;
244. Sambanis, Using Case Studies, supra note 17, at 267, 271.
245. See Davenport et al., supra note 23.
246. See GHAI, supra note 49, at 18.
247. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000: HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 59 (2000). Democracy is also argued to fulfill the right to self-determination through its close link to political participation.
248. See GHAI, supra note 49, at 18.
249. ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 25.
250. There is a lively debate over the relationship between human rights and democracy. It is commonly argued that these human rights are defining features of democracy, because their protection is a necessary condition for popular control over government. See DAVID BEETHAM, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 89-114 (1999);
251. UNDP, supra note 94, at 56-59;
252. Anthony J. Langlois, Human Rights without Democracy? A Critique of the Separationist Thesis, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 990 (2003). Others, recognizing that democracy and human rights can be in tension, argue that their asserted interdependence is overstated, but concede that the former may serve the latter if other social and institutional conditions are favorable.
253. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Democracy and Development, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 608 (1999);
254. Lin Chun, Human Rights and Democracy: The Case for Decoupling, 5 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 19 (2001).
255. Many cross-national studies find a statistical association between democracy and respect for personal integrity rights. See Henderson, supra note 88;
256. Poe & Tate, supra note 1;
257. Keith, ICCPR, supra note 1;
258. Milner et al., supra note 34;
259. Poe et al., supra note 1;
260. Zanger, supra note 1;
261. Keith, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 1;
262. Keith & Poe, supra note 1;
263. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights, supra note 88;
264. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 1. Some find this association for a wider range of civil rights.
265. See Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression, supra note 83;
266. Davenport, Democratic Proposition, supra note 83. There is limited cross-national evidence that democratization has an immediate positive effect of respect for personal integrity rights.
267. See Davenport, Democratic Proposition, supra note 83;
268. Zanger, supra note 1. Recent studies, however, find evidence that consistent improvement in respect for personal integrity rights is only associated with full democracy.
269. See Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 1;
270. Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 1. Moreover, other studies suggest that democratic transitions may be accompanied by more repression.
271. See Helen Fein, More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 170 (1995);
272. Milner et al., supra note 34. More research is needed on this count, as few studies have properly investigated the effect of the process of democratization on respect for civil rights. Regarding respect for socioeconomic rights, cross-national studies also suggest that democracies may be better guarantors of physical quality of life.
273. See Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Politics, the State and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 661 (1985);
274. Bruce London & Bruce A. Williams, National Politics, International Dependency, and Basic Needs Provision: A Cross-National Analysis, 69 SOC. FORCES 565 (1990);
275. Frank W. Young, Do some Authoritarian Governments Foster Physical Quality of Life?, 22 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 351 (1990);
276. K.A.S. Wickrama & Charles L. Mulford, Political Democracy, Economic Development, Disarticulation, and Social Well-Being in Developing Countries, 37 SOC. Q. 375 (1996);
277. R. Scott Frey & Ali Al-Roumi, Political Democracy and the Physical Quality of Life: The Cross-National Evidence, 47 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 73 (1999);
278. Milner et al., supra note 34. Note that some of these studies use measures of democracy that do not maintain a conceptual distinction from political and civil rights; it is thus not possible to disentangle the effect of respect for civil and political rights from other aspects of democracy. More importantly, given the indicators used, inferences from these studies regarding the impact on respect for social and economic rights are problematic for the reasons outlined above, supra note 55. Research on this relationship using adequate indicators is urgently needed.
279. See Ellingsen, supra note 13;
280. Hegre et al., supra note 15;
281. Mousseau, supra note 15.
282. For studies of human rights violations using Polity data, see Blanton, supra note 34;
283. Milner et al., supra note 55;
284. Poe et al., supra note 1;
285. Davenport, Democratic Proposition, supra note 83;
286. Keith, ICCPR, supra note 1;
287. Zanger, supra note 1;
288. Apodaca, Global Economic Patterns, supra note 83;
289. Hathaway, supra note 83;
290. Keith, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 1;
291. Keith & Poe, supra note 1;
292. Davenport, Democratic Pacification, supra note 1;
293. Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 1;
294. Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 1;
295. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights, supra note 88;
296. Hafner-Burton, Right or Robust?, supra note 88;
297. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 1;
298. Melander, Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse, supra note 1;
299. Neumayer, supra note 1.
300. For studies of political violence and internal conflict using this data, see Benson & Kugler, supra note 63;
301. Ellingsen, supra note 13;
302. Hegre et al., supra note 15;
303. Sambanis, Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars, supra note 13;
304. Mousseau, supra note 15;
305. Elbadawi & Sambanis, supra note 13;
306. Marta Reynal-Querol, Ethnicity Political Systems, and Civil Wars, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 29 (2002);
307. Fearon & Laitin, supra note 4;
308. Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 15;
309. Collier et al., supra note 61;
310. Fearon, supra note 4;
311. Sambanis, What is Civil War?, supra note 2;
312. Walter, supra note 15;
313. Caprioli, supra note 13;
314. Melander, Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict, supra note 13;
315. Regan & Norton, supra note 15.
316. Polity scores measure the availability of institutions permitting citizens to participate in the political system, but not actual political behavior. Points are assigned along five authority dimensions: competitiveness of political participation; regulation of political participation; competitiveness of executive recruitment; openness of executive recruitment; and constraints on chief executive. See Monty G. Marshall et al., Polity IV, 1800-1999: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 40 (2002). Many researchers consider the Polity IV measure to be superior to most other quantitative indicators of democracy. However, along with other available measures, it has been criticized for a number of conceptual and empirical inadequacies, including its failure to account for the conceptual multi-dimensionality of democracy. The latter means that empirical studies using such measures may often treat political systems with vastly different combinations of democratic institutions and behavior as the same level of democracy. Inferences based on such measures also need to be treated with caution because they cannot be made to all dimensions of democracy.
317. See Joe Foweraker & Roman Krznaric, Measuring Liberal Democratic Performance: an Empirical and Conceptual Critique, 48 POL. STUD. 759 (2000);
318. Gerardo L. Munck & Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 5 (2002).
319. Conflict data from PRIO/Uppsala, supra note 4. Polity data from Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003, available at http:// www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
320. See Benson & Kugler, supra note 63;
321. Ellingsen, supra note 13;
322. Hegre et al., supra note 15;
323. Mousseau, supra note 15;
324. Sambanis, Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars, supra note 13;
325. Reynal-Querol, supra note 99;
326. Fearon & Laitin, supra note 4;
327. Caprioli, supra note 13;
328. Melander, Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict, supra note 13;
329. Regan & Norton, supra note 15. Substantially, this effect is often small compared to other risk factors in these studies.
330. See Hegre et al., supra note 15;
331. Mousseau, supra note 15;
332. Melander, Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict, supra note 13;
333. Regan & Norton, supra note 15.
334. See Lacina, supra note 62, at 193-95.
335. See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 4.
336. Studies have provided some evidence for this notion, by equating regime endurance in prior years with political stability and any regime change (over a certain threshold) with instability. See Ellingsen, supra note 13;
337. Hegre et al., supra note 15;
338. Fearon & Laitin, supra note 4;
339. Sambanis, What is Civil War?, supra note 2. However, institutional regime change is, arguably, a rather crude measure of political instability.
340. See Hegre et al., supra note 15;
341. Mousseau, supra note 15;
342. Melander, Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict, supra note 13.
343. See SNYDER, supra note 16;
344. CHUA, supra note 16.
345. See Hegre et al., supra note 15. One study finds that democratization does not have an independent effect on political violence over and beyond the effect of democracy itself.
346. See Mousseau, supra note 15. Few quantitative studies have investigated this issue to date.
347. This article addresses missing data problems by calculating the net changes in available polity scores, summing all annual changes during the period. Thus, an "autocratic change" indicates an overall change resulting in greater autocracy, regardless of the total number of changes, or possible democratic change in some individual country-years.
348. This may be the case regardless of whether elections are considered legitimate by the majority of the population or outsiders; if elections threaten powerful interests, however small in numbers, they may respond with violence regardless. After all, if the political system was considered legitimate by all, rebellion would be pointless.
349. Sambanis, Using Case Studies, supra note 17, at 271.