Security rights, subsistence rights, and liberties: A theoretical survey of the empirical landscape

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 403-443

  Milner, Wesley T ^a   Poe, Steven C ^b,c,d   Leblang, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EVANSVILLE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

^c William Penn University   (United States)

^d Department of Peace Studies ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HUMAN RIGHTS; LEGISLATION; SECURITY THREAT;

EID: 0032780124     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (211)

1. Examples include Freedom House, (visited 16 Feb. 1999); U.S. Department of State, Policy: Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, available in (last modified 9 Dec. 1998); Amnesty International, (visited 16 Feb. 1999).
2. Examples include Freedom House, (visited 16 Feb. 1999); U.S. Department of State, Policy: Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, available in (last modified 9 Dec. 1998); Amnesty International, (visited 16 Feb. 1999).
3. Examples include Freedom House, (visited 16 Feb. 1999); U.S. Department of State, Policy: Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, available in (last modified 9 Dec. 1998); Amnesty International, (visited 16 Feb. 1999).
4. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980).
5. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120 (1991) [hereinafter Conditions Affecting]; Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) [hereinafter Population Pressures]; Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe et al., Domestic Threat and the Abuse of the Human Right to Personal Integrity, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (18-21 Apr. 1996) (on file with author); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Jr., Which Personal Integrity Rights Does a State Choose to Violate and Why?, Paper Presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, Boulder, Colo. (June 1997) (on file with author).
6. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120 (1991) [hereinafter Conditions Affecting]; Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) [hereinafter Population Pressures]; Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe et al., Domestic Threat and the Abuse of the Human Right to Personal Integrity, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (18-21 Apr. 1996) (on file with author); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Jr., Which Personal Integrity Rights Does a State Choose to Violate and Why?, Paper Presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, Boulder, Colo. (June 1997) (on file with author).
7. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120 (1991) [hereinafter Conditions Affecting]; Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) [hereinafter Population Pressures]; Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe et al., Domestic Threat and the Abuse of the Human Right to Personal Integrity, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (18-21 Apr. 1996) (on file with author); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Jr., Which Personal Integrity Rights Does a State Choose to Violate and Why?, Paper Presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, Boulder, Colo. (June 1997) (on file with author).
8. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120 (1991) [hereinafter Conditions Affecting]; Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) [hereinafter Population Pressures]; Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe et al., Domestic Threat and the Abuse of the Human Right to Personal Integrity, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (18-21 Apr. 1996) (on file with author); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Jr., Which Personal Integrity Rights Does a State Choose to Violate and Why?, Paper Presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, Boulder, Colo. (June 1997) (on file with author).
9. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120 (1991) [hereinafter Conditions Affecting]; Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) [hereinafter Population Pressures]; Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe et al., Domestic Threat and the Abuse of the Human Right to Personal Integrity, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (18-21 Apr. 1996) (on file with author); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Jr., Which Personal Integrity Rights Does a State Choose to Violate and Why?, Paper Presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, Boulder, Colo. (June 1997) (on file with author).
10. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120 (1991) [hereinafter Conditions Affecting]; Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) [hereinafter Population Pressures]; Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe et al., Domestic Threat and the Abuse of the Human Right to Personal Integrity, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (18-21 Apr. 1996) (on file with author); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Jr., Which Personal Integrity Rights Does a State Choose to Violate and Why?, Paper Presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, Boulder, Colo. (June 1997) (on file with author).
11. See Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 661 (1985); BRUCE E. MOON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS (1991); Wesley T. Milner, Economic Freedom, Democracy and Basic Human Rights, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto (20 Mar. 1997) (on file with author).
12. See Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 661 (1985); BRUCE E. MOON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS (1991); Wesley T. Milner, Economic Freedom, Democracy and Basic Human Rights, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto (20 Mar. 1997) (on file with author).
13. See Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 661 (1985); BRUCE E. MOON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS (1991); Wesley T. Milner, Economic Freedom, Democracy and Basic Human Rights, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto (20 Mar. 1997) (on file with author).
14. For cross-national examinations of variation in political and civil liberties, see James C. Strouse & Richard P. Claude, Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (Richard P. Claude ed., 1976). For a discussion of the frequency of government sanctions, see EDUARD A. ZIECENHACEN, THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT (1986); Christian Davenport, Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression, 23 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 119 (1995) [hereinafter Assessing the Military]; Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683 (1995) [hereinafter Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception]; Christian Davenport, The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression, 49 POL. RES. Q. 377 (1996) [hereinafter The Weight of the Past]; Christian Davenport, Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are Suppressed, 58 J. POL. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Promises].
15. For cross-national examinations of variation in political and civil liberties, see James C. Strouse & Richard P. Claude, Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (Richard P. Claude ed., 1976). For a discussion of the frequency of government sanctions, see EDUARD A. ZIECENHACEN, THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT (1986); Christian Davenport, Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression, 23 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 119 (1995) [hereinafter Assessing the Military]; Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683 (1995) [hereinafter Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception]; Christian Davenport, The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression, 49 POL. RES. Q. 377 (1996) [hereinafter The Weight of the Past]; Christian Davenport, Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are Suppressed, 58 J. POL. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Promises].
16. For cross-national examinations of variation in political and civil liberties, see James C. Strouse & Richard P. Claude, Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (Richard P. Claude ed., 1976). For a discussion of the frequency of government sanctions, see EDUARD A. ZIECENHACEN, THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT (1986); Christian Davenport, Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression, 23 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 119 (1995) [hereinafter Assessing the Military]; Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683 (1995) [hereinafter Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception]; Christian Davenport, The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression, 49 POL. RES. Q. 377 (1996) [hereinafter The Weight of the Past]; Christian Davenport, Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are Suppressed, 58 J. POL. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Promises].
17. For cross-national examinations of variation in political and civil liberties, see James C. Strouse & Richard P. Claude, Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (Richard P. Claude ed., 1976). For a discussion of the frequency of government sanctions, see EDUARD A. ZIECENHACEN, THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT (1986); Christian Davenport, Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression, 23 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 119 (1995) [hereinafter Assessing the Military]; Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683 (1995) [hereinafter Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception]; Christian Davenport, The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression, 49 POL. RES. Q. 377 (1996) [hereinafter The Weight of the Past]; Christian Davenport, Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are Suppressed, 58 J. POL. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Promises].
18. For cross-national examinations of variation in political and civil liberties, see James C. Strouse & Richard P. Claude, Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (Richard P. Claude ed., 1976). For a discussion of the frequency of government sanctions, see EDUARD A. ZIECENHACEN, THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT (1986); Christian Davenport, Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression, 23 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 119 (1995) [hereinafter Assessing the Military]; Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683 (1995) [hereinafter Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception]; Christian Davenport, The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression, 49 POL. RES. Q. 377 (1996) [hereinafter The Weight of the Past]; Christian Davenport, Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are Suppressed, 58 J. POL. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Promises].
19. For cross-national examinations of variation in political and civil liberties, see James C. Strouse & Richard P. Claude, Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (Richard P. Claude ed., 1976). For a discussion of the frequency of government sanctions, see EDUARD A. ZIECENHACEN, THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT (1986); Christian Davenport, Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression, 23 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 119 (1995) [hereinafter Assessing the Military]; Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683 (1995) [hereinafter Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception]; Christian Davenport, The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression, 49 POL. RES. Q. 377 (1996) [hereinafter The Weight of the Past]; Christian Davenport, Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are Suppressed, 58 J. POL. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Promises].
20. See Cyrus Vance, Human Rights Policy, Washington: Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, PR 194, 1977; SHUE, supra note 2; JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989).
21. See Cyrus Vance, Human Rights Policy, Washington: Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, PR 194, 1977; SHUE, supra note 2; JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989).
22. SHUE, supra note 2, at 19.
23. DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 38-45.
24. But see Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights?: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467 (1983); Reinhard Heinish, The Status of Basic Human Rights in the World: Political and Economic Explanations of Cross-National Differences in Government Basic Human Rights Performance and Effort (1994) (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University) (dealing explicitly with more than one class of rights).
25. But see Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights?: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467 (1983); Reinhard Heinish, The Status of Basic Human Rights in the World: Political and Economic Explanations of Cross-National Differences in Government Basic Human Rights Performance and Effort (1994) (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University) (dealing explicitly with more than one class of rights).
26. See generally BENJAMIN A. MOST & HARVEY STARR, INQUIRY, LOGIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1989) (discussing the "islands of theory" phenomenon and reviewing the literature on that issue).
27. DONNEILY, supra note 6, at 188.
28. Examples include Brazil and South Korea during the 1970s. For some of the early discussions concerning tradeoffs, see Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); and JAGDISH BHAGAVATI, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1966).
29. Examples include Brazil and South Korea during the 1970s. For some of the early discussions concerning tradeoffs, see Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); and JAGDISH BHAGAVATI, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1966).
30. Examples include Brazil and South Korea during the 1970s. For some of the early discussions concerning tradeoffs, see Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); and JAGDISH BHAGAVATI, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1966).
31. Vance, supra note 6.
32. Howard, supra note 9.
33. Aung San Suu Kyi, Transcending the Clash of Cultures: Freedom, Development and Human Worth, 6 J. DEMOC. 11 (1995).
34. See Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 866, 867 (indicating that economic development and political liberties are linked to less personal integrity rights abuses); see also Moon & Dixon, supra note 4; Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Basic Needs and Growth-Welfare Trade-Offs, 36 INT'L STUD. Q. 191 (1992) (stating that subsistence rights and economic development are related). A number of authors find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e. GNP). See Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 661; Robert Rosh, The Impact of Third World Defense Burdens on Basic Human Needs, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 135 (1986); Nancy Spalding, Providing for Economic Human Rights: The Case of the Third World, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 123 (1985); MOON, supra note 4, at 131. Howard disputes the notion that civil and political rights can or must be suspended until after economic development has been achieved. Howard, supra note 9, at 478. Kyi argues that the three kinds of rights to be addressed in this article are essentially intertwined. For this reason, arguments that there are trade-offs between these rights are mere "pretexts for resisting calls for democracy and human rights." Kyi, supra note 15, at 11.
35. See Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 866, 867 (indicating that economic development and political liberties are linked to less personal integrity rights abuses); see also Moon & Dixon, supra note 4; Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Basic Needs and Growth-Welfare Trade-Offs, 36 INT'L STUD. Q. 191 (1992) (stating that subsistence rights and economic development are related). A number of authors find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e. GNP). See Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 661; Robert Rosh, The Impact of Third World Defense Burdens on Basic Human Needs, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 135 (1986); Nancy Spalding, Providing for Economic Human Rights: The Case of the Third World, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 123 (1985); MOON, supra note 4, at 131. Howard disputes the notion that civil and political rights can or must be suspended until after economic development has been achieved. Howard, supra note 9, at 478. Kyi argues that the three kinds of rights to be addressed in this article are essentially intertwined. For this reason, arguments that there are trade-offs between these rights are mere "pretexts for resisting calls for democracy and human rights." Kyi, supra note 15, at 11.
36. See Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 866, 867 (indicating that economic development and political liberties are linked to less personal integrity rights abuses); see also Moon & Dixon, supra note 4; Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Basic Needs and Growth-Welfare Trade-Offs, 36 INT'L STUD. Q. 191 (1992) (stating that subsistence rights and economic development are related). A number of authors find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e. GNP). See Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 661; Robert Rosh, The Impact of Third World Defense Burdens on Basic Human Needs, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 135 (1986); Nancy Spalding, Providing for Economic Human Rights: The Case of the Third World, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 123 (1985); MOON, supra note 4, at 131. Howard disputes the notion that civil and political rights can or must be suspended until after economic development has been achieved. Howard, supra note 9, at 478. Kyi argues that the three kinds of rights to be addressed in this article are essentially intertwined. For this reason, arguments that there are trade-offs between these rights are mere "pretexts for resisting calls for democracy and human rights." Kyi, supra note 15, at 11.
37. See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORID POLITICS 7-8 (1989).
38. In addition, regional and secondary agreements are also supportive of these basic rights. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]; European Social Charter, signed 18 Oct. 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 38 (entered into force 26 Feb. 1965), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 212 (Committee on Foreign Affairs ed., 1983); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, signed 2 May 1948, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, at 17 (1988) [hereinafter ADRD]; American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/11.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979) (entered into force 18 July 1978), reprinted in 9 I.LM. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 26 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter].
39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, C.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 127 (1949) [hereinafter UDHR].
40. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
41. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
42. UDHR, supra note 19, at art. 3.
43. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 6.
44. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 7.
45. In addition to the UDHR and the ICCPR, the right to personal integrity is covered by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 21 Dec. 1965, art. 5, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966 [hereinafter CERD]); Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, arts. 6, 37, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force 2 Sept. 1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989); African Charter, supra note 18, arts. 4, 6 ; ECHR, supra note 18, at art. 2; European Social Charter, supra note 18, art. 5; and the American Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4, 7.
46. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 19, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9.
47. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 9; ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9.
48. SHUE, supra note 2, at 65-87. It should be noted that Shue does not make the specific argument that economic rights are necessarily required in order enjoy other rights. Id.
49. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 21. See also ADRD, supra note 18, art. XX; African Charter, supra note 18, art. 13, § 1 (demanding this same right to participation).
50. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 25.
51. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 21, art 25. See also ECHR, supra note 18, protocol 1, art. 3; African Charter, supra note 18, art. 13, § 1.
52. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 25. Interestingly, the UDHR and the ICCPR use the term "genuine election." UDHR, supra note 19, art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 25. However, it is unclear whether this covers an election in which only one candidate or a list of candidates is offered and no opposition to the governing party is present, or allowed. While there was debate over this controversy during the drafting of the UDHR and the ICCPR, the vague term "genuine" remained. For a discussion of this language, see Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209, 240 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
53. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 25.
54. Typically, the Western notion of economic rights accepts only those rights dealing with production and property ownership. The second type of economic rights usually associated with consumption (e.g. subsistence rights) is more controversial and less universally accepted.
55. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17. While the ADRD recognizes the right to private property, it restricts it to "the essential needs of decent living." ADRD, supra note 18, art. XXIII. The American Convention, the ECHR, and the African Charter discuss the "use and enjoyment of property," the "peaceful enjoyment of his possessions," and "the right to property," respectively. American Convention, supra note 18, art. 21; ECHR supra note 18, protocol 1, art. 1; African Charter, supra note 18, art. 14. However, none of these documents specifically refers to ownership per se.
56. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17.
57. American Convention, supra note 18, art. 21.
58. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 25.
59. Id.
60. ICESCR, supra note 20, art. 11, § 1.
61. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 20, art. 12, § 1.
62. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 26; ICESCR, supra note 20, art. 13, § 1. See also CERD, supra note 25; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1980) (entered into force 3 Sept. 1981), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980); Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 25; African Charter, supra note 18; American Convention, supra note 18.
63. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 26; ICESCR, supra note 20, art. 13, § 2(a).
64. Han S. Park, Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies, 9 HUM. RIS. Q. 405, 410-13 (1987).
65. Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 689-90.
66. See Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 862-66; Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Rights to Personal Integrity Revisited, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto (Mar. 1997) (on file with author).
67. See Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 862-66; Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Rights to Personal Integrity Revisited, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto (Mar. 1997) (on file with author).
68. See Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 862-66; Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Rights to Personal Integrity Revisited, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto (Mar. 1997) (on file with author).
69. Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3, at 126.
70. See Will H. Moore, et al., Land Reform, Political Violence and the Economic Inequality-Political Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Analysis, 21 INT'L INTERACTIONS 335 (1996); Maro Ellina & Will H. Mosore, Discrimination and Political Violence: A Cross-National Study with Two Time Periods, 43 W. POL. Q. 267, 268-71 (1990); Ted Gurr, A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1104 (1968).
71. See Will H. Moore, et al., Land Reform, Political Violence and the Economic Inequality-Political Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Analysis, 21 INT'L INTERACTIONS 335 (1996); Maro Ellina & Will H. Mosore, Discrimination and Political Violence: A Cross-National Study with Two Time Periods, 43 W. POL. Q. 267, 268-71 (1990); Ted Gurr, A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1104 (1968).
72. See Will H. Moore, et al., Land Reform, Political Violence and the Economic Inequality-Political Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Analysis, 21 INT'L INTERACTIONS 335 (1996); Maro Ellina & Will H. Mosore, Discrimination and Political Violence: A Cross-National Study with Two Time Periods, 43 W. POL. Q. 267, 268-71 (1990); Ted Gurr, A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1104 (1968).
73. See Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3; Poe et al., supra note 46; David Richards, Settling the Score: Elections and Governmental Violations of Physical Integrity (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
74. See Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3; Poe et al., supra note 46; David Richards, Settling the Score: Elections and Governmental Violations of Physical Integrity (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
75. See Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3; Poe et al., supra note 46; David Richards, Settling the Score: Elections and Governmental Violations of Physical Integrity (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
76. See generally id.
77. Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3.
78. Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3.
79. Id.
80. Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 855.
81. William J. Dixon, Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 14, 15 (1994).
82. Helen Fein, More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 170 (1995). Here, Fein boldly questions the conventional wisdom of a strictly linear relationship between democracy and human rights in favor of a curvilinear relationship. This means that as democracy increases, human rights practices do not follow a straight, upward trajectory. Rather, the line that represents the relationship is best represented by a curve.
83. Id.
84. Id. While this article has substantially covered the linkage between political freedom and security rights, it will not expand on the potential linkages between economic freedom and security rights. The simple reasoning here is that there is little if any theoretical justification for assuming that economic rights are associated with integrity of the person rights.
85. Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 661; Rosh, supra note 16, at 142; Spalding, supra note 16, at 131-33; MOON, supra note 4, at 131.
86. Spalding, supra note 16, at 127.
87. Rosh, supra note 16, at 141.
88. Zehra Fatima Arat, The Viability of Political Democracy in Developing Countries (1984) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Binghamton: State University of New York at Binghamton); ZEHRA F. ARAT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (1991) (purporting that the stability of political democracy relies on a balance between civil-political rights and socioeconomic rights.) Arat concentrates on the formal decision-making processes of political systems. Here, democracy is synonymous with popular sovereignty or public control of government. Popular sovereignty/public control of government takes into account 1) nature of political participation; 2) inclusiveness of the political process; 3) competitiveness of party system; and 4) protection of civil liberties. Id.
89. Zehra Fatima Arat, The Viability of Political Democracy in Developing Countries (1984) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Binghamton: State University of New York at Binghamton); ZEHRA F. ARAT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (1991) (purporting that the stability of political democracy relies on a balance between civil-political rights and socioeconomic rights.) Arat concentrates on the formal decision-making processes of political systems. Here, democracy is synonymous with popular sovereignty or public control of government. Popular sovereignty/public control of government takes into account 1) nature of political participation; 2) inclusiveness of the political process; 3) competitiveness of party system; and 4) protection of civil liberties. Id.
90. Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 675.
91. MOON, supra note 4, at 138.
92. Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 371, 386 (1980) [hereinafter Issues]; Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps, 25 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 7, 8-9 (1990) (stating that the measurement of democracy utilized by Bollen follows six conventional standards of measurement beginning with the provision of a theoretical definition of democracy) [hereinafter Political Democracy]. Bollen defines democracy as "the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized." Bollen, Issues, supra, at 372. For further expansion of the operationalization of democracy in later works, see Arat, supra note 60, at 48; Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1207 (1993) [hereinafter Liberal Democracy].
93. Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 371, 386 (1980) [hereinafter Issues]; Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps, 25 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 7, 8-9 (1990) (stating that the measurement of democracy utilized by Bollen follows six conventional standards of measurement beginning with the provision of a theoretical definition of democracy) [hereinafter Political Democracy]. Bollen defines democracy as "the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized." Bollen, Issues, supra, at 372. For further expansion of the operationalization of democracy in later works, see Arat, supra note 60, at 48; Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1207 (1993) [hereinafter Liberal Democracy].
94. Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 371, 386 (1980) [hereinafter Issues]; Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps, 25 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 7, 8-9 (1990) (stating that the measurement of democracy utilized by Bollen follows six conventional standards of measurement beginning with the provision of a theoretical definition of democracy) [hereinafter Political Democracy]. Bollen defines democracy as "the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized." Bollen, Issues, supra, at 372. For further expansion of the operationalization of democracy in later works, see Arat, supra note 60, at 48; Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1207 (1993) [hereinafter Liberal Democracy].
95. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
96. See supra notes 43-46; id.
97. JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1975-1995, at 91 (1997). This is contingent on the fact that this economic freedom is indeed credible and potentially long-lasting.
98. Gerald W. Scully, The Institutional Framework and Economic Development, 96 J. POL. ECON. 652 (1988).
99. Id.
100. David A. Leblang, Property Rights, Democracy and Economic Growth, 49 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1996).
101. GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 53. The economic freedom ratings that range from zero to ten are also broken down into grades: countries with ratings of 8.0 or more were assigned an A; 7.0 to 7.99 a B; 6.0 to 6.99 a C; 5.0 to 5.99 a D; 4.0 to 4.99 an F; and less than 4.0 an F-. Id. Details of the overall economic freedom index can be found in Appendix III.
102. DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 165.
103. Id. at 166.
104. Howard, supra note 9, at 470.
105. Id. at 482.
106. Paul Streeten, Basic Needs and Human Rights, 8 WORLD DEV. 107 (1980). He uses the example of a society organized as either a benevolent zoo or a less benevolent, well-run prison where physical needs are met at a high level but political and civil rights would be denied. Id. He continues that political rights in the form of one man-one vote might conflict with the provision of these basic human needs. Id.
107. Id. at 109-11. Streeten also includes civil and security rights as negative rights. Id.
108. Id. at 109.
109. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 110 (1985).
110. Jan Narveson, Democracy and Economic Rights, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS 29, 55-58 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1992).
111. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
112. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
113. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
114. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
115. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
116. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
117. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
118. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
119. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
120. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
121. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
122. PETER L BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: FIFTY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 81 (1986). For a discussion of economic development as a predictor of democracy, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Measurements and Analysis, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 253 (1963); Arthur K. Smith, Jr., Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 95 (1969); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 903 (1994); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 966 (1995); Kenneth Bollen & Robert Jackman, Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 983 (1995).
123. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-36 (1962).
124. BERGER, supra note 81, at 81.
125. See Id.
126. See Michael Novak, More Liberty, Better Life, 27 FREEDOM REV. 5 (1996).
127. For a discussion of Eastern European countries and their transitions to capitalism, see ANDERS ÅSLUND, GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM (1991); Josef C. Brada, The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How Far? How Fast?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 87 (1993); Peter Murrell, What is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 111 (1993); ANDRAS KOVES, CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION (1992).
128. For a discussion of Eastern European countries and their transitions to capitalism, see ANDERS ÅSLUND, GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM (1991); Josef C. Brada, The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How Far? How Fast?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 87 (1993); Peter Murrell, What is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 111 (1993); ANDRAS KOVES, CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION (1992).
129. For a discussion of Eastern European countries and their transitions to capitalism, see ANDERS ÅSLUND, GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM (1991); Josef C. Brada, The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How Far? How Fast?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 87 (1993); Peter Murrell, What is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 111 (1993); ANDRAS KOVES, CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION (1992).
130. For a discussion of Eastern European countries and their transitions to capitalism, see ANDERS ÅSLUND, GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM (1991); Josef C. Brada, The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How Far? How Fast?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 87 (1993); Peter Murrell, What is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 111 (1993); ANDRAS KOVES, CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION (1992).
131. Zehra F. Aral, Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited, 21 COMP. POL. 21, 23 (1988).
132. Id.
133. Leblang, supra note 70, 19.
134. See David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205 (1985); David L. Cingranelli & Thomas E. Pasquarello, Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 539 (1985); Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 3; Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 854; Fein, supra note 55, at 170; Poe et al., supra note 3; Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 3.
135. See David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205 (1985); David L. Cingranelli & Thomas E. Pasquarello, Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 539 (1985); Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 3; Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 854; Fein, supra note 55, at 170; Poe et al., supra note 3; Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 3.
136. See David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205 (1985); David L. Cingranelli & Thomas E. Pasquarello, Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 539 (1985); Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 3; Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 854; Fein, supra note 55, at 170; Poe et al., supra note 3; Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 3.
137. See David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205 (1985); David L. Cingranelli & Thomas E. Pasquarello, Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 539 (1985); Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 3; Henderson, Conditions Affecting, supra note 3; Henderson, Population Pressures, supra note 3; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 854; Fein, supra note 55, at 170; Poe et al., supra note 3; Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 3.
138. SHUE, supra note 2, at 29-34.
139. Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 854.
140. See Michael Stohl et al., State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 592 (1986); George A. Lopez & Michael Stohl, Problems of Concept and Measurement in the Study of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATISTICS: GETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 216 (Thomas B. Jabine & Richard P. Claude eds., 1992).
141. See Michael Stohl et al., State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 592 (1986); George A. Lopez & Michael Stohl, Problems of Concept and Measurement in the Study of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATISTICS: GETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 216 (Thomas B. Jabine & Richard P. Claude eds., 1992).
142. See Stohl et al., supra note 93, at 596-97; Lopez & Stohl, supra note 93, at 222-23; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 855.
143. See Mark Gibney & Matthew Dalton, The Political Terror Scale, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73 (David L. Cingranelli vol. ed., 1996) (4 POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS (Stuart S. Nagel ed. 1996)).
144. See Mark Gibney & Matthew Dalton, The Political Terror Scale, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73 (David L. Cingranelli vol. ed., 1996) (4 POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS (Stuart S. Nagel ed. 1996)).
145. Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 859-60.
146. See Judith Eleanor Innes, Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination of the State Department Country Reports, in HUMAN RIGHTS ASD STATISTICS: GETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 93, at 235; Poe & Tate, supra note 3, at 864.
147. Innes, supra note 97, at 236.
148. Various other studies have also used these indices. See generally Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 18 INT'L INTERACTIONS 1 (1993) [hereinafter Africa]; Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During the Reagan Years, 75 SOC. SCI. Q. 494 (1994) [hereinafter Reagan Years]; Mark Gibney & Michael Stohl, Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 151 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002 (1987); Carleton & Stohl, supra note 90; Michael Stohl et al., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter, 21 J. PEACE RES. 215 (1984).
149. Various other studies have also used these indices. See generally Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 18 INT'L INTERACTIONS 1 (1993) [hereinafter Africa]; Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During the Reagan Years, 75 SOC. SCI. Q. 494 (1994) [hereinafter Reagan Years]; Mark Gibney & Michael Stohl, Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 151 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002 (1987); Carleton & Stohl, supra note 90; Michael Stohl et al., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter, 21 J. PEACE RES. 215 (1984).
150. Various other studies have also used these indices. See generally Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 18 INT'L INTERACTIONS 1 (1993) [hereinafter Africa]; Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During the Reagan Years, 75 SOC. SCI. Q. 494 (1994) [hereinafter Reagan Years]; Mark Gibney & Michael Stohl, Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 151 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002 (1987); Carleton & Stohl, supra note 90; Michael Stohl et al., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter, 21 J. PEACE RES. 215 (1984).
151. Various other studies have also used these indices. See generally Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 18 INT'L INTERACTIONS 1 (1993) [hereinafter Africa]; Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During the Reagan Years, 75 SOC. SCI. Q. 494 (1994) [hereinafter Reagan Years]; Mark Gibney & Michael Stohl, Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 151 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002 (1987); Carleton & Stohl, supra note 90; Michael Stohl et al., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter, 21 J. PEACE RES. 215 (1984).
152. Various other studies have also used these indices. See generally Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 18 INT'L INTERACTIONS 1 (1993) [hereinafter Africa]; Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During the Reagan Years, 75 SOC. SCI. Q. 494 (1994) [hereinafter Reagan Years]; Mark Gibney & Michael Stohl, Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 151 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002 (1987); Carleton & Stohl, supra note 90; Michael Stohl et al., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter, 21 J. PEACE RES. 215 (1984).
153. In order to be consistent with the scales of the other variables, the original five-point security rights scale is receded so that countries with more severe human rights violations exhibit a lower rating while nations with fewer violations are assigned a higher rating.
154. See Norman Hicks & Paul Streeten, Indicators of Development: The Search for a Basic Needs Yardstick, 7 WORLD DEV. 567 (1979); MORRIS DAVID MORRIS, MEASURING THE CONDITION OF THE WORLD'S POOR: THE PHYSICAL QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX (1979); MOON, supra note 4, at 20-24. First, GNP is an index of aggregate production rather than personal income or consumption. Second, the issues involving the evaluation of output from different countries in a common measure is very troublesome. Third, the economic cost of a good is not a measure of its ability to enhance welfare. Finally, goods required to meet basic needs simply may not be available at any price, irrespective of income or GNP. See MOON, supra note 4, at 20-22.
155. See Norman Hicks & Paul Streeten, Indicators of Development: The Search for a Basic Needs Yardstick, 7 WORLD DEV. 567 (1979); MORRIS DAVID MORRIS, MEASURING THE CONDITION OF THE WORLD'S POOR: THE PHYSICAL QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX (1979); MOON, supra note 4, at 20-24. First, GNP is an index of aggregate production rather than personal income or consumption. Second, the issues involving the evaluation of output from different countries in a common measure is very troublesome. Third, the economic cost of a good is not a measure of its ability to enhance welfare. Finally, goods required to meet basic needs simply may not be available at any price, irrespective of income or GNP. See MOON, supra note 4, at 20-22.
156. Hicks & Streeten, supra note 101, at 571.
157. Id. at 578.
158. MORRIS, supra note 101. Examples of some composite indices that have been proposed include JAN DREWNOWSKI & WOLF SCOTT, THE LEVEL OF LIVING INDEX (1966); DONALD V. MCGRANAHAN ET AL., CONTENTS AND MEASUREMENT OF SOCIDECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1972); and the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which combined seven social and economic indicators, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT (1975). The most recent measurement offered by the United Nations is the Human Development Index, which combines indicators of national income, life expectancy, and educational attainment. UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (published annually since 1991). Although this measurement is an improvement over some previous attempts, it presents several shortcomings. These include only measuring human development since 1990 and mixing ends and means (i.e., income is means of achieving human development while standards of health and educational achievement are ends). UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 13, 19 (1992).
159. MORRIS, supra note 101. Examples of some composite indices that have been proposed include JAN DREWNOWSKI & WOLF SCOTT, THE LEVEL OF LIVING INDEX (1966); DONALD V. MCGRANAHAN ET AL., CONTENTS AND MEASUREMENT OF SOCIDECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1972); and the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which combined seven social and economic indicators, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT (1975). The most recent measurement offered by the United Nations is the Human Development Index, which combines indicators of national income, life expectancy, and educational attainment. UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (published annually since 1991). Although this measurement is an improvement over some previous attempts, it presents several shortcomings. These include only measuring human development since 1990 and mixing ends and means (i.e., income is means of achieving human development while standards of health and educational achievement are ends). UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 13, 19 (1992).
160. MORRIS, supra note 101. Examples of some composite indices that have been proposed include JAN DREWNOWSKI & WOLF SCOTT, THE LEVEL OF LIVING INDEX (1966); DONALD V. MCGRANAHAN ET AL., CONTENTS AND MEASUREMENT OF SOCIDECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1972); and the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which combined seven social and economic indicators, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT (1975). The most recent measurement offered by the United Nations is the Human Development Index, which combines indicators of national income, life expectancy, and educational attainment. UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (published annually since 1991). Although this measurement is an improvement over some previous attempts, it presents several shortcomings. These include only measuring human development since 1990 and mixing ends and means (i.e., income is means of achieving human development while standards of health and educational achievement are ends). UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 13, 19 (1992).
161. MORRIS, supra note 101. Examples of some composite indices that have been proposed include JAN DREWNOWSKI & WOLF SCOTT, THE LEVEL OF LIVING INDEX (1966); DONALD V. MCGRANAHAN ET AL., CONTENTS AND MEASUREMENT OF SOCIDECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1972); and the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which combined seven social and economic indicators, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT (1975). The most recent measurement offered by the United Nations is the Human Development Index, which combines indicators of national income, life expectancy, and educational attainment. UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (published annually since 1991). Although this measurement is an improvement over some previous attempts, it presents several shortcomings. These include only measuring human development since 1990 and mixing ends and means (i.e., income is means of achieving human development while standards of health and educational achievement are ends). UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 13, 19 (1992).
162. MORRIS, supra note 101. Examples of some composite indices that have been proposed include JAN DREWNOWSKI & WOLF SCOTT, THE LEVEL OF LIVING INDEX (1966); DONALD V. MCGRANAHAN ET AL., CONTENTS AND MEASUREMENT OF SOCIDECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1972); and the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which combined seven social and economic indicators, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT (1975). The most recent measurement offered by the United Nations is the Human Development Index, which combines indicators of national income, life expectancy, and educational attainment. UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (published annually since 1991). Although this measurement is an improvement over some previous attempts, it presents several shortcomings. These include only measuring human development since 1990 and mixing ends and means (i.e., income is means of achieving human development while standards of health and educational achievement are ends). UNITED NATIONS, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 13, 19 (1992).
163. More specifically, the indicators are a) number of infant deaths per 1000 live births, b) life expectancy at age one, and c) the percentage of population fifteen years of age and older that is literate. See MORRIS, supra note 101, at 30.
164. In constructing his index, Morris lays out six criteria that all composite measures should meet. These are: 1) It should not assume that there is only one pattern of development. 2) It should avoid standards that reflect the values of specific societies. 3) It should measure results, not inputs. 4) It should be able to reflect the distribution of social results. 5) It should be simple to construct and easy to comprehend. 6) It should lend itself to international comparison. MORRIS, supra note 101, at 21. The PQLI indeed meets all of these criteria.
165. See Mark Bayless & Susan Bayless, Current Quality of Life Indicators: Some Theoretical and Methodological Concerns, 41 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 421 (1982); Robert Justin Goldstein, The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATISTICS: GETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 93, at 35; Hicks & Streeten, supra note 101; David A. Larson & Walton T. Wilford, The Physical Quality of Life Index: A Useful Social Indicator?, 7 WORLD DEV. 581 (1979). For a detailed address of the numerous criticisms of the PQLI, see MORRIS, supra note 101, at 41-56; Hicks & StreeTen, supra note 101, at 576; Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 663; MOON, supra note 4, at 25-31.
166. See Mark Bayless & Susan Bayless, Current Quality of Life Indicators: Some Theoretical and Methodological Concerns, 41 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 421 (1982); Robert Justin Goldstein, The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATISTICS: GETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 93, at 35; Hicks & Streeten, supra note 101; David A. Larson & Walton T. Wilford, The Physical Quality of Life Index: A Useful Social Indicator?, 7 WORLD DEV. 581 (1979). For a detailed address of the numerous criticisms of the PQLI, see MORRIS, supra note 101, at 41-56; Hicks & StreeTen, supra note 101, at 576; Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 663; MOON, supra note 4, at 25-31.
167. See Mark Bayless & Susan Bayless, Current Quality of Life Indicators: Some Theoretical and Methodological Concerns, 41 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 421 (1982); Robert Justin Goldstein, The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATISTICS: GETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 93, at 35; Hicks & Streeten, supra note 101; David A. Larson & Walton T. Wilford, The Physical Quality of Life Index: A Useful Social Indicator?, 7 WORLD DEV. 581 (1979). For a detailed address of the numerous criticisms of the PQLI, see MORRIS, supra note 101, at 41-56; Hicks & StreeTen, supra note 101, at 576; Moon & Dixon, supra note 4, at 663; MOON, supra note 4, at 25-31.
168. MORRIS, supra note 101, at 47-49.
169. MOON, supra note 4, at 27. The Spearman rank order correlation measures the direction and strength of relationship between two ordinal scale variables (the correlation ranges from -1.0 to 1.0). The measure of 0.98 indicates that there is a very strong, positive relationship between the various alternatives to weighting (i.e., there is little variation obtained from assigning different weights).
170. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 27 (1963); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-90 (1956); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 23-24 (1957); GERHARD E. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 319 (1966).
171. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 27 (1963); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-90 (1956); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 23-24 (1957); GERHARD E. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 319 (1966).
172. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 27 (1963); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-90 (1956); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 23-24 (1957); GERHARD E. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 319 (1966).
173. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 27 (1963); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-90 (1956); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 23-24 (1957); GERHARD E. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 319 (1966).
174. See Bollen, Issues, supra note 64, at 372; Bollen, Political Democracy, supra note 64, at 8; Bollen, Liberal Democracy, supra note 64, at 1208-09.
175. See Bollen, Issues, supra note 64, at 372; Bollen, Political Democracy, supra note 64, at 8; Bollen, Liberal Democracy, supra note 64, at 1208-09.
176. See Bollen, Issues, supra note 64, at 372; Bollen, Political Democracy, supra note 64, at 8; Bollen, Liberal Democracy, supra note 64, at 1208-09.
177. Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr, Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data, 32 J. PEACE RES. 469 (1995).
178. Id. at 471.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 471-72.
183. Id. at 473-76.
184. Arat, supra note 61, at 48; Bollen, Issues, supra note 64, at 375-76; Bollen, Liberal Democracy, supra note 64, at 1208-10, 1224-26; Michael Coppedge & Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Measuring Polyarchy, 25 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 51 (1990); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (published annually 1978-1994).
185. Arat, supra note 61, at 48; Bollen, Issues, supra note 64, at 375-76; Bollen, Liberal Democracy, supra note 64, at 1208-10, 1224-26; Michael Coppedge & Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Measuring Polyarchy, 25 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 51 (1990); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (published annually 1978-1994).
186. Arat, supra note 61, at 48; Bollen, Issues, supra note 64, at 375-76; Bollen, Liberal Democracy, supra note 64, at 1208-10, 1224-26; Michael Coppedge & Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Measuring Polyarchy, 25 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 51 (1990); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (published annually 1978-1994).
187. Arat, supra note 61, at 48; Bollen, Issues, supra note 64, at 375-76; Bollen, Liberal Democracy, supra note 64, at 1208-10, 1224-26; Michael Coppedge & Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Measuring Polyarchy, 25 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 51 (1990); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (published annually 1978-1994).
188. To make such an assessment, this study utilized the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.
189. Jaggers & Gurr, supra note 112, at 475-76.
190. For an examination of the linkage between economic choice and human rights, see supra section II.B.3. A nation will achieve rapid growth at high levels of economic freedom only if this freedom is indeed credible and expected to be relatively long-lasting.
191. Ronald W. Jones & Alan C. Stockman, On the Concept of Economic Freedom, in RATING GLOBAL ECONOMIC FREEDOM 11, 13 (Stephen T. Easton & Michael A. Walker eds., 1992). Constrained transactions are simply those that are in some way restricted by governmental action (i.e. resulting in a loss of economic freedom).
192. GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 12. It is important to note the distinction between economic freedom and political and civil liberties. Nations may indeed exhibit high levels of political rights and civil liberties while at the same time achieve a relatively low level of economic freedom. Examples include Sweden, India, and Israel.
193. FREEDOM HOUSE, WORLD SURVEY OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM: 1995-1996 at 5-18 (1996).
194. The Fraser Institute provides the most complex index incorporating 17 components that cover four areas of economic freedom: 1) money and inflation, 2) government operations and regulations, 3) takings and discriminatory taxation, and 4) international exchange. A zero to ten rating scale is used for each component. See GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 16.
195. See id. at 6. This work is a culmination of six symposia from 1984 through 1993 where some of the most respected economists cooperated to forge an acceptable measure of economic freedom. For a discussion of these symposia, see FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE (Michael A. Walker ed., 1988);
196. RATING GLOBAL ECONOMIC FREEDOM, supra note 123;
197. ECONOMIC FREEDOM: TOWARD A THEORY OF MEASUREMENT (Walter Block ed., 1991); GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 67.
198. See Jaggers & Gurr, supra note 112; MORRIS DAVID MORRIS, MEASURING THE CHANGING CONDITION OF THE WORLD'S POOR: THE PHYSICAL QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX, 1960-1990, at 90-113 (1996); GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 230-39. The Amnesty International Human Rights Index is derived from research conducted by Stephen C. Poe and C. Neal Täte. See Poe & Tate, supra note 3.
199. These numbers were taken from research conducted by Stephen C. Poe and C Neal Tate. See Poe & Tate, supra note 3.
200. Christian Davenport, Regime Change and Political Repression: Direction, Coherence and Persistence (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
201. See GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 230-39.
202. See generally Vance, supra note 6; Howard, supra note 9; DONNELLY, supra note 6; Kyi, supra note 15.
203. Kyi, supra note 15.
204. Fein, supra note 55, at 170.
205. Poe et al., supra note 3.
206. Poe & Tate, supra note 3.
207. Poe & Sirirangsi, Africa, supra note 99; Poe & Sirirangsi, Reagan Years, supra note 99.
208. Poe & Sirirangsi, Africa, supra note 99; Poe & Sirirangsi, Reagan Years, supra note 99.
209. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 90.
210. For further details on coding and content analysis, see Gibney & Dalton, supra note 95.
211. See id. at 73.