Logical pluralism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 475-493

  Beall, J C ^a   Restall, Greg ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942677984     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048400012349751     Document Type: Article

References (54)

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