Can deflationists be dialetheists?

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 30, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 593-608

  Armour Garb, Bradley ^a   Beall, J C ^b  

^a WOLFSON COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Deflationism; Dialetheism; Liar paradox; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745740570     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013306202546     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Armour-Garb, B. and Beall, J. C.: Semantic Spandrels: The Case for Dialetheism, to appear (2001).
2. Armour-Garb, B. and Beall, J. C.: Should deflationists be dialetheists?, to appear (2001).
3. Beall, J. C. and Restall, G.: Logical pluralism, Australas. J. Philos. 78 (2000), 475-493.
4. Belnap, N. and Gupta, A.: The Revision Theory of Truth., MIT Press, 1993.
5. Belnap, N. D.: How a computer should think, in G. Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, Oriel Press, 1977.
6. Belnap, N. D.: A useful four-valued logic, in J. Michael Dunn and G. Epstein (eds), Modern Uses of Multiple- Valued Logics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977, pp. 8-37.
7. Brendel, E.: Circularity and the debate between deflationist and substantive theories of truth, in A. Chapuis and A. Gupta (eds), Circularity, Definition and Truth, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 29-47.
8. Brown, B.: Yes, Virginia, there really are paraconsistent logics, J. Philos. Logic 28(5) (1999), 489-500.
9. Chapuis, A. and Gupta, A. (eds): Circularity, Definition and Truth, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2000.
10. David, M.: Correspondence and Disquotation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
11. Field, H.: The deflationary conception of truth, in G. MacDonald and C. Wright (eds), Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic', Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 55-117.
12. Field, H.: Deflationist views of meaning and content, Mind, 103 (1994), 249-285.
13. Gould, S. J. and Lewontin, R. C.: The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme, Proc. Roy. Soc. London 205 (1978), 581-598.
14. Horwich, P.: The minimalist conception of truth, in S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds), Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 239-263.
15. Kripke, S.: Outline of a theory of truth, J. Philos. 72 (1975), 690-716.
16. Leeds, S.: Theories of reference and truth, Erkenntnis, 13 (1978), 111-129.
17. Priest, G.: In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1987.
18. Priest, G.: Paraconsistent logic, in D. M. Gabbay and F. Günthner (eds), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd edn, Vol. 3, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 200+, forthcoming.
19. Priest, G.: Truth and contradiction, Philos. Quart. 50(200) (2000), 305-319.
20. Van Orman Quine, W.: Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970.
21. Van Orman Quine, W.: Quiddities, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
22. Rescher, N. and Brandom, R.: The Logic of Inconsistency, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, NJ, 1979.
23. Resnik, M.: Immanent truth, Mind 99 (1990), 405-424.
24. Resnik, M.: Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997.
25. Restall, G.: Ways things can't be, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 39 (1997), 583-596.
26. Restall, G.: Negation in relevant logics: How I stopped worrying and learned to love the Routley star, In D. Gabbay and H. Wansing (eds), What is Negation?, Appl. Logic Series 13, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, pp. 53-76.
27. Simmons. K.: Deflationary truth and the liar, J. Philos. Logic 28(5) (1999), 455-488.