The Logic of Backwards Inductions

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 267-285

  Priest, Graham ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85012437537     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267100000250     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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