Reserve prices in auctions as reference points

Economic Journal

Volumn 117, Issue 520, 2007, Pages 637-653

  Rosenkranz, Stephanie ^a   Schmitz, Patrick W ^b  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PRICE DYNAMICS; TRADE;

EID: 34250026094     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02044.x     Document Type: Article

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