Reaching pareto-optimality in prisoner's dilemma using conditional joint action learning

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 91-108

  Banerjee, Dipyaman ^a   Sen, Sandip ^a  

^a The University of Tulsa Tulsa   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Multiagent learning; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249676853     PISSN: 13872532     EISSN: 15737454     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-007-0020-8     Document Type: Article

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