Implicit negotiation in repeated games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2333 LNAI, Issue , 2002, Pages 393-404

  Littman, Michael L ^a   Stone, Peter ^a  

^a AT AND T LABS RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTELLIGENT AGENTS; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING; COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS;

BEST RESPONSE; EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION; GENERAL SUM GAMES; Q-LEARNING; REPEATED GAMES; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; SUBOPTIMALITY;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS;

EID: 80053136974     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45448-9_29     Document Type: Conference Paper

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