Nonunitary actors in spatial models: How far is far in foreign policy?

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 479-500

  Hug, Simon ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033445727     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043004004     Document Type: Article

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