Accession and reform of the European Union: A game-theoretical analysis of eastern enlargement and the constitutional reform

European Union Politics

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 419-439

  König, Thomas ^a   Bräuninger, Thomas ^b  

^a Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agricultural policy; Core; Enlargement; Institutional reform; Qualified majority voting; Spatial model

Indexed keywords

EID: 29244439715     PISSN: 14651165     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1465116504047311     Document Type: Article

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